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There are three chapters in my dissertation. In chapter one I study the impact of govern-
ment corruption on tax avoidance by corporations with tax liability in China. I begin by developing
a model of a firm’s choice of tax avoidance based on the level of corruption in the firm’s province.
I show that a higher level of government corruption and a higher tax rate are predicted to increase
a firm’s tax avoidance. My empirical estimates show that a one-standard-deviation increase in gov-
ernment corruption corresponds to a 6% increase in tax avoidance by firms, based on data from
nearly 600,000 firms from 1998 to 2007. When I separate the sample by type of ownership of firms, I
find that domestic private firms tend to avoid a larger portion of their tax liabilities than foreign or
state-owned firms. I also find that tax avoidance increases when the effective tax rate increases. The
size of the firm, age of the firm, and whether the firm exports from China also influence tax avoidance.
In chapter two, a joint work with Sergey Mityakov, we study the impact of competition on
tax avoidance by corporations in Mexico. Using more than 2,000 firm level data, we show that firms
tend to avoid more taxes in less competitive markets, that is more concentrated market. A one
standard deviation increase in competition leads to a 7.7% increase in tax avoidance. By splitting
the sample based on ownership structure, we show that domestic firms avoid more taxes. When we
separate the firms according to the plant size, we find that larger firms tend to avoid more taxes. We
find robust and consistent results by using different competition measures and other robustness tests.
In chapter three, I theoretically demonstrate how fiscal decentralization affects corruption.
The theory predicts that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption. This result is then tested using
a panel data set of 31 provincial level government from 1998 to 2007 in China. My estimates suggest
that fiscal decentralization in government expenditures and government revenue is negatively corre-
ii
lated with corruption. Using leader and location dummy variables, I find that central government
leaders can influence the corruption level in China. I also find that more developed regions in China
tend to be less corrupt.
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Chapter 1




The corporate income tax is an increasingly important source of tax revenue in China.
During the period 1998 to 2007, for example, corporate income tax revenue increased from RMB
92.6 billion to RMB 877.9 billion, which represents an increase in its share of total tax revenue
from about 10% to over 19%. The increasing importance of corporate tax as a tax revenue source
naturally raises the question of the severity of tax avoidance, which makes the study of tax avoidance
important.
Corporate tax avoidance happens in both developed countries and developing countries.
The noncompliance rate for the corporate income tax in the United States is estimated to be more
than 13% (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod, 2005). According to Global
Financial Integrity, China is number one among the developing countries in illicit financial outflow




noncompliance rate was about 30% during the period 1998 to 2007.2
In this paper, I address questions on the factors that influence tax avoidance. First, how
does government corruption influence tax avoidance? Second, do different types of firms respond to
government corruption differently? Corruption and tax avoidance are currently two of the important
aspects in most countries. Corrupt governments may give firms an incentive to avoid tax. However,
little attention has been paid to the impact of government corruption on corporate tax avoidance. In
addition, I study how the effective tax rate and specific firm characteristics influence tax avoidance.
Even though the statutory corporate tax rates faced by domestic firm and foreign firms are the
same, the effective tax rates faced by them differ because of tax holidays given to foreign firms, tax
rebates, and local governments set varies tax credit to compete for firms.
To answer these questions, I first develop a theoretical model of a firm’s choice of tax
avoidance when considering government corruption and tax rate. Then I use data on a large number
of Chinese firms to show the impact of government corruption on tax avoidance using firm-level fixed
effect estimation and an instrumental variable method. I also take advantage of a tax policy change,
the Tax Sharing Act of 2002. The act instituted a new policy where the national tax bureau collects
corporate tax for all firms established in or after 2002, while local tax bureaus collect corporate tax
from domestic private firms established before 2002.
In this paper, tax avoidance is measured by profit hiding, which is the difference between
imputed profits and reported profits. This measure includes both tax avoidance and tax evasion.3
An example of tax avoidance is transfer pricing, and I address this by considering whether firms
export from China to other countries. The example for tax evasion is that firms evade more tax
when dealing with a more corrupt government. Corruption is measured by the number of convictions
per thousand government employees in each province.4
Using a data set of nearly 600,000 Chinese firms, I empirically examined how government
corruption affects the tendency of firms to avoid tax. Using fixed effects regressions, I find that
2Twenty-three percent of the corporations having sales of more than RMB 5 million reported a negative profit.
The number of tax avoidance was calculated by first obtaining the share of tax revenue collected according to reported
profit (RMB 1,438 billion) divided by total corporate income tax revenue from 1998 to 2007 (RMB 3,649 billion), and
then comparing the share of profit hiding and reported profit.
3It is hard to draw a line between tax avoidance and tax evasion because the difference is not always clear. Tax
evasion is illegally paying less tax than the law mandates, and it is subject to a fine and a prison sentence. Tax
avoidance is taking advantage of loopholes and paying less tax. It is sometimes hard to tell the difference between
the two; there is even a tax court in the United States to deal with disputes. The more complicated the tax law, the
more difficult to tell the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Refer to Slemrod and Yitzhaki(2002) and
Hanlon and Heitzman(2010) for more detailed information on tax avoidance and tax evasion.
4In this paper, the provincial level governments including 22 provinces, 4 municipalities, and 5 autonomous regions.
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firms avoid more corporate income tax in a more corrupt province. The effect of corruption on a
firm’s profit hiding is significant: one standard deviation change in corruption can explain about
6% of the tax avoidance. Besides firm fixed effects regression, I also run two stage least squares
estimation using the tie of the province with central political bureau members as an instrument.
The instrumental variable method yields the same results with a larger magnitude for corruption
coefficients. I find supporting evidence by using a natural experiment, the Tax Sharing Act, to
examine the effect of corruption on tax avoidance.
When it comes to tax avoidance decisions, firms respond differently to the level of corruption
in a province, based on their ownership structure. This paper examines how the ownership structure
of a firm influences tax avoidance. I split the sample into state-owned enterprises, private domestic
corporations, and foreign corporations. I find that private domestic firms hide more profits compared
with the other two types of firms. The effect of corruption on tax avoidance for private domestic
firms is twice the effect of corruption on tax avoidance for foreign firms and state-owned enterprises.
Larger firms tend to hide more profit, and that may be why the tax bureau closely monitors
larger firms in China. However, the tax non-compliance rate of larger firms is lower compared with
that of smaller firms. It is hard for large firms to successfully hide a large proportion of their profits.
When holding other variables constant, firms that export from China avoid more tax and have a
lower compliance rate given that it is easier for such firms to use transfer pricing. However, the
effects for foreign firms are not significant, because the tax rate for such firms is lower at this time;
it is hard for them to make more profit by using transfer pricing. As the age of a foreign firm
increases, it tends to hide more profit but at a decreasing rate.
Effective tax rate also plays a role when firms make a tax avoidance decision. I find that
firms tend to avoid more tax when facing higher effective tax rates. This result is confirmed when
using the natural experiment that foreign firms face different tax rates at different stages of operation
in China. Specifically, I compare the first two years after they generate positive profit with the third
to fifth years after they generate positive profit, where the tax rate is 0% and 15%, respectively. I
find that given the same level of corruption, firms avoid more tax when the tax rate is increased to
15% from 0%. I get the same results when using only the second year as the year with a 0% tax
rate compared with the fourth year with a 15% tax rate.
Some additional analyses and robustness tests support my findings that firms avoid more
profit in more corrupt provinces. First, I analyze the model by using a balanced panel that includes
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only firms that stayed in the sample for all of the 10 years. Second, using the balanced panel, I use
a new way to calculate tax avoidance by using weighted imputed profit to correct for the influence
of different accounting rules for output and depreciation. Third, because the results may potentially
be influenced by outliers, I estimate the model using the sample by dropping the top and bottom
0.5% of the main variables. Fourth, I include the lagged two years corruption term to deal with the
tax avoidance that may be influenced by the level of corruption of a province for more than one
year. All of these alternative specifications support the main empirical results.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. To the best of my knowledge,
this paper is the first empirical study to investigates how government corruption affects a firm’s tax
avoidance. There are several studied at corruption and individual income tax evasion. The model of
tax avoidance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) based on the model of crime (Becker, 1968) argues
that optimal tax evasion depends on the probability of getting caught, the level of the penalty for
evasion and the degree of risk aversion. Akdede (2006) shows that if the size of bribes and tax
evasion are negatively correlated, taxpayers will prefer to pay taxes if the necessary bribe is too
large. There is not much empirical work on corporate tax avoidance, because it is hard to qualify
firm behavior. Goerke (2008) shows that at the firm level, tax evasion does not influence corruption,
and he found there is no obvious relationship between the two. This paper is related to that of
Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000), which shows, using several East European
countries’ firm level data, that bureaucratic corruption is connected with hiding output. Uslaner
(2010) use survey data of transaction countries to show that giving gifts to government officials leads
to lower sales reported for tax purposes.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the measurement of tax avoidance.5
Many measures of tax avoidance have been used. The effective tax rate measure is used by Dyreng
et al.(2008). Fisman and Wei (2004) estimate the tax evasion by the difference between the value
that China reports as imports from Hong Kong and the value that Hong Kong reports as exports
to China, using data from 1997 and 1998. Another way to measure tax evasion is to find book-tax
differences of publicly traded firms (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). There is also research based on
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit data that uses the amount of positive adjustment to a firm’s
liability after audit as the measure of tax avoidance (Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod, 2005; DeBacker,
Heim, and Tran, 2011). Because most of the firms in my sample are not publicly traded, I cannot use
5Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) broadly review the literature on measurements of tax avoidance.
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the book-tax difference. To measure the extent of tax avoidance, one must figure out the actual profit
from a firm’s financial sheets. Cai and Liu (2009) measure tax avoidance by comparing imputed
profit and reported profit. In this paper, I improve the Cai and Liu (2009) measure of imputed
profits by using weighted output and weighted depreciation to get weighted imputed profit. Because
imputed profit is calculated based on national income account system, it may differ from the firm’s
true profit calculated based on generally accepted accounting standards. For example, profit may
be biased because firms may use different rules of depreciation, and not all of the output may be
converted to current year revenue. Using weighted imputed profit can mitigate such problems.
Third, this paper is related to the growing literature on the determinants and consequences
of tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is not necessarily a good thing, because of the cost of not being
transparent. Tax evasion is not simply a money transfer from state to firm, given that there is a
principal agent problem (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). The effects of a principal agent problem
on tax avoidance is also tested by Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Chen and Chu (2005). There
is also evidence of tax enforcement on firm value and stock price (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales, 2007;
Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011; and Mironov 2013). Cai and Liu (2009) show that firms in competitive
environments tend to engage in more tax avoidance activities. This is consistent with the fact that
unethical behavior leads to more tax avoidance. This paper adds to the empirical results on the
effects of effective tax rate, size of firm, and transfer pricing on tax avoidance. This paper is also
among the first few to empirically examine firm characteristics that influence corporate tax avoidance
in the context of China. Determinants of tax avoidance have previously been investigated using data
from American firms. Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2005) showed that assets, number of employees,
and intangible assets influence tax avoidance. I get consistent results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple analytical frame-
work. Section 3 describes the data and how I construct my measure of corruption and tax avoidance
and other variables. Section 4 presents the empirical model and empirical results. Section 5 provides
robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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1.2 A Simple Analytical Framework
This section develops a simple model of a firm’s choice of compliance rate where bribery is
also a choice. For any firm, expected true profit can be written as
Πe(B, θ) = R− T (θ)−B − P e(B, θ) (1.1)
where R is net operation revenue, T (θ) is corporate income tax payment, B is bribe payments to
government officials, and P e(B, θ) is the expected penalty for underpayment of taxes. Corporation
income tax defined as T (θ) = τθR, where τ is the effective tax rate that applies to the firm and θ is
the degree of tax compliance rate, satisfies 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Even though in China the tax rates are set by
the central government, different firms may have different tax rates, depending on whether there is a
local government tax competition or whether the firms are domestic or international. The tax rates
differs for domestic firms and foreign firms, because tax holidays are given to foreign firms. Tax
rates vary for foreign firms at different stages of operation. Detailed information will be introduced
in Section 4.
Expected penalties with no corruption are defined as Φ(θ). The penalties are more severe




of corrupt officials can reduce P e(B, θ) through reduced monitoring or a lower penalty if detected.
So the expected penalty with corruption is defined as
P e(B, θ) = [1− CpΨ(B)]Φ(θ) (1.2)
where Cp is an index of corruption in province p, defined as 0 ≤ Cp ≤ 1. Ψ(B) is a function of
bribe and satisfies ∂Ψ∂B > 0 and
∂2Ψ
∂B2 < 0. Given the level of corruption in a province Cp, more bribe
payments lead to less severe penalties.
Expected profit for a firm is therefore given by
Πe(B, θ) = (1− τθ)R−B − [1− CpΨ(B)]Φ(θ) (1.3)
6The penalties can be 0.5 to 5 times the amount of underpaid tax, according to the severity of underpayment.
Penalties range from an additional 0.5 to 5 times the amount of tax evasion; penalty range from 1 to 5 times for
defrauding tax refund; penalty range from 0.5 to 3 times for failing to withhold or collect tax. The more you evade,
the more severe the penalty. The most severe penalty imposed for tax crimes is life imprisonment. If the amount
evaded amounts to more than RMB 100,000 and more than 10% of the total taxes payable, the taxpayer could be
criminally charged and subject to criminal sanctions according to Article 201 of the Criminal Law.
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The firm chooses a tax compliance rate, θ, to maximize profit, Πe, so the first order condition is
∂Πe
∂θ




A firm’s choice of B satisfies
∂Πe
∂B




Bribe B and compliance rate θ are decided by tax rate τ and Cp, from the two first order conditions,
giving








The comparative statics of equation (1.6) and equation (1.7) lead to the following two propositions.
Proposition 1 All else equal, the tax compliance rate is lower in a more corrupt province.
Proof : See Appendix A
Intuitively, in a more corrupt province, firms are more likely to establish a relationship with
government officials through bribes, so the officials would be less likely to audit the firms or levy less
severe penalties once the firms are caught; thus, firms would be more likely to hide more of their
profits.
Proposition 2 All else equal, the tax compliance rate is lower when effective tax rate is higher.
Proof : See Appendix B
Given the same cost of hiding profit, firms with higher tax rates receive more benefits by
hiding profits, so firms facing higher tax rates will try to hide more of their profits.
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1.3 Data and Variable Definitions
1.3.1 Data
The data in this paper come from a variety of sources. Firm level data were obtained from
the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by China Bureau of Statistics. This data set
includes all firms with annual sales of more than RMB 5 million (about $625,000) during the period
1998 to 2007. Growth in the number of large corporations doing business in China has been driving
the nation’s economic growth. The number of corporations in this data set more than doubled during
the sample period, increasing from 139,521 to 331,500. Information about firm characteristics are
drawn from balance sheets, cash flow statements, and income statements.
The number of convictions for the abuse of public office in each province are from the provin-
cial reports in the Chinese Procuratorial Yearbook. The data source for the remaining variables is
the China Statistical Yearbook.
To get a clean sample and correct the measurement errors in the data sets, I exclude firm-
year observations with zero, negative, or missing values for the following variables: total assets, total
sales, gross value of industrial output, paid-in capital, net value of fixed assets, total depreciation,
number of employees, wages, and intermediate goods. I also exclude observations when current
depreciations are greater than cumulative depreciations, liquid assets are greater than total assets,
and fixed assets are greater than total assets.7 After the data construction, my sample contains
2,068,867 observations representing 595,035 firms.
1.3.2 Measurement of Firm Tax Avoidance
The data contain pre-tax profits reported by each firm. To estimate tax avoidance, the
firm’s real profit is needed. However, knowing a firm’s true profit is a challenge. As mentioned in
Section 1, many ways have been used to estimate tax avoidance. In this paper, I follow Cai and Liu
(2009) by calculating tax avoidance using the difference between imputed profit and reported profit.
Explicitly, imputed profit is generated by using the equation
ImputedProfitit = Outputit−Inputsit−Depreciationit−FinancialCostit−Wageit−V ATit (1.8)
7There still may potentially be problems with misreporting, especially in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of the
data. Later I conduct a robustness test by dropping the top and bottom 0.5 percentile for the main variables of the
data and find similar results.
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where Outputit is the value of total output of firm i in year t, Inputsit is total intermediate inputs,
Depreciationit is current year depreciation, FinancialCostit is the financial cost of firm taking loans
from banks or other costs involved in financial activities, Wageit is total wages paid to workers, and
V ATit is the total value added tax paid by firm i in year t.
This imputed profit is calculated on the basis of national income account system and may
differ from the firm’s true profit calculated on the basis of generally accepted accounting standards,
given that firms may have different rules for depreciation and that not all of the output converts
into firm revenue in the same year. To deal with this potential problem, I calculate the imputed
profit using weighted output and weighted depreciation. I will report the weighted output by using
95% of current year output and 5% of previous year output, the weighted depreciation is using 95%
of current year depreciation and 5% of previous year depreciation.8
Firms try to hide profit in two ways: by understating output, and by overstating inputs,
depreciation, the financial cost, wages, and the tax payment. Even though most of these firms
are manufacturing firms, they should have extra revenues besides the total value of output, so the
imputed profit here should be approximately a lower bound of the firm’s profits.9
In this paper, tax avoidance is measured by profit hiding PHit, that is, the difference
between imputed profit and reported profit, defined as
PHit = ImputedProfit−ReportedProfit (1.9)
Besides the level of profit hiding, the noncompliance rate of corporation income tax is an important






Noncompliance rate is normalized by assets instead of profit because profit is a noisy measure; it is
harder for firms to lie about their assets than their profits. The correlation between imputed profit
and reported profit is 0.63, so there is a strong correlation between imputed profit and reported
profit. Figures 1.1 through 1.3 show the histograms of reported and imputed profit, profit hiding,
8I get similar results by using 85% of current year and 15% of previous year output and depreciation as well as
90% of current year and 10% of previous year output and depreciation.
9Taxable income is total income less deductions. The main total income includes production and operational
income and assets resale income. The main deductions includes invest payment, labor wage before tax, and employee
welfare.
9
and profit hiding normalized by assets, respectively.10 Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show that the distribution
of profit hiding and of profit hiding normalized by assets is skewed to the right, which gives evidence
that firms tend to hide their profits. Profit hiding is mostly close to zero, which suggests there are
firms that report their profit truthfully. As we can see from the graphs, profit hiding sometimes has
negative values. One reason is that the imputed profit is possibly the lower bound that can be seen
in Figure 1.1 histogram of imputed profit and reported profit. Another potential reason for this is
that it happens when firms are not familiar with the tax law and do not use all of the deductions or
other items that are deductible.
1.3.3 Measurement of Corruption
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon seen in both developing and developed countries.
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, China has been ranked
between 72nd and 78th out of 178 countries in recent years.
One of the challenges of this empirical research is finding a measurement of corruption,
because corruption is illicit and thus secretive. Many measurements have been used in the literature
on corruption. That include the corruption rating data sets provided by Transparency International
and the World Bank and by the International Country Risk Guide, which is published by Political
Risk Service. These data sets include a corruption perceptions index, a bribe payers index, global
corruption report, and more. Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009) construct two measures of corruption
bribe frequency and bribe amount. However, these data sets rely on the aggregated perceptions of
businessmen or country experts, many of whom may have formed impressions based on common
press depictions.
Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Goel and Nelson (2011) use the number of convictions for
abuse of public office in 50 states in United States as a measure of corruption. Similarly, I use the
number of convictions for abuse of public office normalized by per thousand government employees
in a province as a measure of corruption. This measure is used as an indicator for corruption because
the People’s Procuratorates in each province is guided by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of
China. Therefore, the rate of catching corrupt activity is likely to be close given that the inspections
are conducted in each province following the same rules from the central bureau.
10The imputed profit can be considered as the lower bound of a firm’s true profit. Thus profit hiding has a negative
number.
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Convicted graft, taking bribes, and embezzlement are the main reasons for the conviction
numbers in each province. The number of convictions for each province is shown in Figure 1.4. The
number of convicted officials in a province varies a lot, from as low as 41 in Tibet to as many as
3,881 in Henan province. The number of convictions for each province normalized by per thousand
government employees is shown in Figure 1.5. To get a general sense of the corruption level across
the provinces, I generate the average corruption level for each province in Figure 1.6.
According to the criminal law of China, any state functionary who takes advantage of his
office to accept bribes shall be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment. The funds or articles that
he received as bribes shall be confiscated, and public funds or articles shall be recovered.11 Whoever
offers or introduces a bribe to a state functionary shall be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment
of not more than three years or criminal detention.
1.3.4 Other Variables
Before the reform and opening policy started in 1978, most firms in China were state-owned
enterprises. The percentage of state owned firms has changed considerably since then. I separate
ownership into state owned enterprise, private domestic firms, and foreign firms according to the
share of paid-in capital.12 If the state share of paid-in capital is the biggest share, it is counted as
a state owned enterprise. If the largest share of paid in capital is from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao,
and other countries, the firm is counted as a foreign firm. The remaining are private firms, including
the largest share of paid in capital from collected owner, private owner, or legal person. I construct
three dummy variables, Dstate, Dprivate, and Dforeign, for state-owned, private, and foreign firms,
respectively.
For the period 1998 to 2007, the percentage of state-owned enterprises decreased from 33.24%
to 3.55%, while that of foreign firms increased by 50%, from about 10% to about 15%. The detailed
percentage of each type of firm is shown in Table 1.1. This period reflects the privatization of state-
11According to article 383 the Criminal law of China, those accepting bribes of more than RMB 100,000 shall be
sentenced to imprisonment of more than 10 years, and funds or articles received shall be confiscated; those accepting
bribes between 50,000 and 100,000 shall be sentenced to imprisonment of more than 5 years and funds or articles
received shall be confiscated; those accepting bribes between 5,000 and 50,000 shall be sentenced to imprisonment of
more than 1 year and no more than 7 years, and funds or articles received shall be confiscated; those accepting bribes
less than 50,000 shall be sentenced to imprisonment of no more than 2 years for severity case, and funds or articles
received shall be confiscated.
12Using paid-in capital instead of registration due to the registered firm type may not accurately reflect their
activity. Firms will less likely to lie about their paid-in capital. Therefore, the share of paid-in capital would be a
better measure compared with the reported type when they first registered.
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owned firms and shutting down of some firms. Usually, private firms are relatively small compared
with the state-owned firms in this sample. State-owned enterprises receive favorable policies. For
example, they can easily get loans from a bank or get funds from the central government through
tax expenditure. During the sample period, foreign firms enjoy tax holidays, and their tax rates are
lower compared with domestic firms, both state-owned and private.
According to the corporate income tax in China, the corporate income tax rate for domestic
firms, both state-owned and private, is 33%.13 The corporate income tax rate for foreign firms is
30%.14 Foreign firms, in general, get favorable policies. For example, foreign enterprise may be
entitled to a 0% tax rate in the first two years beginning with the year when it begins making
a profit, and 15% through the third to fifth years.15 Because of tax competition among different
subnational governments, a local government may give preferable tax rules to firms so as to attract
investments.
Besides the statutory difference in tax rates, the effective tax rate the company paid may
be differ because of competition from local government. I use the payable income tax divided by
taxable income to get the effective tax rate. Firms with negative taxable income are not subject to
pay corporate income tax. The total number of observations with positive payable income tax and
taxable income is 963,119.
I create a dummy variable for exports based on whether the firm exports from China,
Dexport. This binary variable takes a value of one if the firm exports output to other countries and
zero otherwise. I construct 37 industry dummy variables for each two-digit industry to capture any
industry fixed effects. The list of 40 industries can be found in Table 1.2. Table 1.2 also shows the
number of firms in each industry and the percentage of firms in each industry. I use 10 year dummy
variables to capture time varying effects. Assets and number of employees are included so as to
capture firm size. Age of the firm is also considered in the regression so as to reflect the effect of
experience in the market on tax avoidance.
13The tax rate is 27% for firms with taxable income lower than RMB 100,000 but higher than RMB 30,000. The
tax rate is 18% for firms with less than RMB 30,000 taxable income. Since the firms I use have more than RMB 5
million as total sales, the tax rate for small firms would not influence my results.
14For a foreign enterprise a local income tax shall be assessed on the taxable income at the rate of 3%, but the
local tax may be waived or reduced by local government.
15As to eligible for this policy, a foreign invested enterprise should have an estimated operation period of more




To examine the effect of government corruption on firm profit hiding behavior, I use the
empirical regression model





ownership + αt + αj + αi + εijpt
(1.11)
In the model, PHijpt is profit hiding for firm i in industry j in province p in year t. Cp(t−1) is
the number of officials convicted of abuse of public office, normalized by the number of government
employees in province p in year t−1. I use the corruption of year t−1 is because firms need to know
the level of corruption in the province in order to make profit hiding decision and because sometimes
firms required to prepay taxes. TAXijpt is the tax rate faced by firm i in year t. ASSETSijpt is
the assets for firm i in industry j in province p in year t.16 EMPLOY EEijpt is the number of
employees for firm i in industry j in province p in year t. AGEijpt is the number of years firm i has
been established in industry j in province p in year t, and AGE2ijpt is the squared term of the age
of firm.Downership is a set of dummy variables for ownership, including state-owned firms, private
firms, and foreign firms. αt is year fixed effect, αj is industry fixed effect, and αi is firm fixed effects.
Firm fixed effects are included to control for firm characteristics that are not observed. Because
3.9% of the observation change industries, industry fixed effects are included to capture industries
characters. εijpt is the error term.
From the propositions derived from the theoretical model,17 I have the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 β1 > 0, that is, a firm’s tax noncompliance is higher when facing a more corrupt
provincial government.
Hypothesis 2 β2 > 0, that is, a firm’s noncompliance rate is higher when facing a higher effective
tax rate.
16When profit hiding is the dependent variable, ASSETS is included in the regression equation. When noncom-
pliance rate is the dependent variable, ASSETS is not included in the regression equation.
17Hypothesis 3 is based on the proposition derivative in appendix C. Appendix C also shows the first two hypotheses
using profit hiding.
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Hypothesis 3 β6 > 0, that is, firms with exports tend to hide more profits.
Firms with exports have incentives to hide more profits because they can avoid taxes through transfer
pricing. Transfer pricing is an important method that accounting companies use to help firms avoid
their tax.
1.4.2 Firm Fixed Effect OLS Regressions
Consistent with my first hypothesis, I find that firms tend to hide more profit in more corrupt
provinces. I report the regression results for all observations and by ownership in Table 1.5. Columns
1 through column 4 show the results when using the noncompliance rate as the dependent variable.
Columns 5 through column 8 show the results when using profit hiding as the dependent variable.
The coefficients on corruption for all specifications are positive and significant. The coefficient for
corruption is higher for private firms compared with state-owned and foreign firms. This means,
all else equal, corruption has more impact on private firms compared with state-owned firms and
foreign firms.
Domestic private firms avoid more tax perhaps because the less favorable policy faced such
private firms compared with state-owned and foreign firms. State owned firms have different incen-
tives compared with private and foreign firms: they do not try to maximize their profit, while the
other two types of firms do. Principal and agent problems may be involved in state-owned enterprises
because the managers care relatively less about the profitability but more about their own utility.
Such problems are less severe in private and foreign corporations. The state-owned enterprises can
easily access credit from state-owned banks and usually face favorable policies. International firms
including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan firms could benefit from foreign direct investment policies
and tax holidays for foreign firms. Thus for private firms, hiding one dollar of profit would save
more compared with state-owned and foreign firms, so private firms would report less profit. This
is consistent with the finding by Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2005) that foreign controlled firms
have a smaller deficiency than domestic firms. This result is also in line with the deficiency rates
of private companies being higher than those of public companies, because privately held firms do
not have pressure from the capital market and thus can report low financial earnings (Cloyd, 1995;
Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock, 1996; and Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod, 2005).
Another reason foreign firms hide less profit is because of the culture of the companies. The
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multinational firms tend to be more transparent and less corrupt (DeBacker, Heim, and Tran, 2012;
Braguinsky and Mityakov, 2013). Firms may face punishment by their home countries, so they
would hide less profit. According to a report18 by Transparency International, out of 39 countries
that make foreign bribery a crime, 7 countries actively enforce it and 12 countries moderately enforce
it. The countries that are heavily invested in China either actively enforce it (the United States,
Germany, and the United Kingdom) or moderately enforce it (Japan, France, and South Korea).
Therefore given that firms may face investigation by their own countries, they have an extra incentive
to report profit honestly. This is consistent with the result by DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012)
that firms evade more tax with owners from countries with a higher corruption norm. That means
firms that are doing business in other countries are also influenced by the regulations of their home
countries.
The estimated coefficient of the export dummy is positive and statistically significant for
domestic firms. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3, that firms with exports tend to avoid more tax.
It is consistent with the fact that firms with exports from China usually have greater tax planning
opportunities. For foreign firms, the tax rate faced by them in China is lower, so the incentive to
shift their profit to other countries is not as great.
The estimated coefficients on assets and the number of employees are positive when profit
hiding is the dependent variable. That means larger firms hide more profit in the absolute term. The
coefficient for the number of employees is negative when using noncompliance rate as the dependent
variable, because bigger firms would receive greater attention from the tax bureau, which would
reduce their incentive to hide higher percentage of their profits. This can be explained by the policy
“grasp the large, control the medium, and let the small go”.19
Larger firms hide more profit, but the noncompliance rate for larger companies is lower,
which is consistent with the IRS report for US corporate income tax. The IRS data show that
the noncompliance rate is lower for larger companies, while total noncompliance is higher for larger
firms (Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod, 2005).20 It is also consistent with Article 201 of the criminal
law, which states that if the amount evaded amounts to more than RMB 100,000 and more than
10% of the total of taxes payable, the taxpayer could be criminally charged and subject to criminal
18http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_of_the_oecd_
anti_bribery_conventio
19I also separate the sample into four groups by assets; the coefficients increase as the firm size increase.
20From the report of IRS, the noncompliance of corporation income tax is $30 billion; more than 80% of the
noncompliance with the corporation income tax is by larger corporations, but the noncompliance rate of larger
companies is lower. Larger firms are defined here as firm with $10 million.
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sanctions. Therefore, firms would strategically respond to this. Bigger firms would evade less than
10% while small firms would evade a higher percentage but make sure the total amount is less than
RMB 100,000.
The estimated coefficient of age of the foreign firms is positive when noncompliance rate
is the dependent variable. This means that the more years in business, the more likely the foreign
firms will hide higher percentage of their profits, which can be explained as learning by doing. The
age of the firm squared is negative, which means foreign firms avoid their profits at a decreasing
rate.
1.4.3 Instrumental Variables
The OLS results are consistent with my hypotheses, but the estimates may be biased.
Specifically, there may be endogeneity problems because the omitted variables may be correlated
with the level of corruption in a province. For example, bribery payments by firms are likely to
influence both government corruption and the firm’s decision to hide profit. Using year and province
fixed effects and lagged terms of corruption helps to an extent. To address the endogeneity problem,
I instrument for corruption.
I use the tie of the province with central political bureau members as an excluded instru-
mental variable for corruption.21 The tie with the central political bureau members is defined as
the connection of the province with central political bureau members. If one of the 25 central po-
litical bureau members was born in the province or was the top leader of the province, then that
relationship counts as a tie with central government. This number is related to corruption given
that the tie with members of the central political bureau can be seen as protection of the local
officials from the central government. A firm’s decision on whether to avoid tax is influenced by
the economic environment and firm characteristics, not by the tie of the province with the central
political bureau. I perform two stage least squares estimation using this instrument. I report the
second stage regression in Table 1.6 and the first stage regression in Table 1.7. From Table 1.6,
we can see that the estimated coefficient for corruption is higher when using the tie with central
committee members as an instrument.
Even though the instrument used in this paper is significant, there may still be the problem
21The central political bureau, also known as Central Politburo, is the 25 people who oversee the Communist Party
of China. It is the most powerful decision-making group in China and has control over personnel appointments.
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of weak instruments; because when the endogenous explanatory variables are close to collinear, it is
difficult to separate the results (Stock and Yogo, 2005). All of the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics
pass the 10% critical value in these results. So the instruments I use in the two stage least squares
estimation are not subject to weak identification problem.
1.4.4 A Natural Experiment—Tax Sharing Act
Changes in the tax enforcement administration in China can be used as a natural experiment
to test how corruption influences tax avoidance. After the tax reform of 1994, the tax collecting
bureau separated into the State Administration of Taxation and local tax bureaus. The State
Administration of Taxation has branch offices at each level of government. The local tax bureaus
governed by local governments follow the guidance of the State Administration of Taxation. They
are responsible for collecting tax revenue for corresponding level local governments. Before 2002 the
national tax bureaus collected corporate income tax from foreign firms and the portion of tax from
state-owned firms that belongs to the central government. Local tax bureaus collect the corporate
income tax on private firms and the portion of state owned firms that belongs to the provincial level
government or lower. Starting in 2002, the national tax bureaus collect the corporate income tax
for all the firms established starting in 2002 according to the Income Tax Sharing Act. For 2002,
the tax revenue was equally shared between the central government and local governments. Starting
in 2003, the central government keeps 60%of the total tax revenue, and the local government keeps
40%. The tax structure in China is shown in Figure 1.7.
Taking advantage of this tax sharing act, I use the interaction term of corruption and a
dummy variable, D2002, to test if there is a significant difference in tax avoidance when the tax
is collected by the State Administration of Taxation versus the local tax bureau. I compared the
the tax avoidance of private firms in different provinces registered before and after 2002. I use the
private firms that were established before 2002 as base group, whose tax was collected by the local
tax bureau.
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The coefficient γ1 on the interaction term of corruption and the established year before or after
2002 measures the average extra effect of corruption on profit hiding when corporate income tax
is collected by the national tax bureau. Because the local tax bureaus have relatively more con-
nection with local private firms, they can more easily take bribes from private firms; the central
tax bureau is less corrupt compared with local tax bureaus because of the direct governing by the
State Administration of Taxation. Table 1.8 shows that the estimated coefficient of the interaction
term of corruption and the dummy variable is negative, which means firms dealing with the State
Administration of Taxation tend to avoid more taxes. The national tax bureau is less corrupted
compared with local tax bureaus; therefore, this natural experiment supports my finding that firms
hide more profit in corrupt provinces.
Corrupt governments will lead to more tax avoidance because the firms know they could pay
less tax. The national tax bureau, which has less connections with local government, is relatively
less corrupt compared with local tax bureaus. It explains why firms established before 2002 hide
more profit. The coefficient after the Tax Sharing Act is small in magnitude, meaning it is harder
for firms to hide profit, given the less corrupt State Administration of Taxation.
1.4.5 Tax Rates and Tax Avoidance
Table 1.9 shows the results when using all the observations with positive tax liability. The
tax rate is derived by dividing taxes paid by reported profit. The average effective tax rate is 26%(the
average effective tax rate for foreign firms is 18% while the average effective tax rate for domestic
firms is 28%). From the results we can see that the sign for tax rate is positive, which is consistent
with Fisman and Wei (2004), who show that a 1% increase in the tax rate leads to a 3% change in
tax evasion.
The effective tax rate may be lower than the statutory tax rate for several reasons. First, the
tax rates for domestic firms and foreign firms differ. Second, there may be a tax refund for foreign
firms with direct investment, according to Article 10 of the Foreign Corporate Income Taxation
Law.22 Third, there may be an implicit tax cut from local governments through favorable tax
22“When a foreign investor of an enterprise with foreign investment makes direct investment in the enterprise with
the profit obtained from the enterprise, thereby increasing the registered capital thereof or using the profit from the
enterprise to establish another enterprise with foreign investment with a schedule operational period of no less than
five years, the foreign investor may get a refund of 40% of the income tax already paid on the reinvested portion of
income upon approval of application by the tax authorities, or enjoy preferential treatment otherwise prescribed by
the State Council. If the reinvestment is withdrawn in less than five years, the refunded tax payment shall be paid
back to the tax authorities.”
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policies. Local government may compete with each other; therefore, the actual tax rate faced by
firms may differ.
The results shown in Table 1.9 illustrate the trend that a tax rate increase will lead to
higher profit hiding for all specifications. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, that a higher tax
rate positively correlates with more tax avoidance. All other independent variables have results
similar to those of the main regression.
1.4.6 A Natural Experiment—Different Tax Rates for Foreign Firms
During my research period, the tax rate for a foreign-invested enterprise is 30% plus a
3% local income tax on taxable income. All foreign invested enterprises except for those located
in the special economic zones are subject to this 3% local tax unless it is exempted. Foreign
invested enterprises enjoy a five-year tax holiday, which is a two-year exemption and a three-year
50% reduction in the applicable tax rate. That is, for newly established foreign firms the tax rate
is 0% for the first two years after generating positive profit, and 15% for third through fifth year
after generating positive profit. Firms can also apply to continue having lower tax rates if certain
conditions are satisfied. Therefore, tax rates for foreign firms differ from year to year. I separated
foreign firms into two groups: firms in the first two years after they generate positive profit, and
firms in the third to fifth years after they generate positive profit. According to Hypothesis 2, the
tax avoidance would be lower for a firm in the first two years of having positive profit compared
with a firm in the third to fifth years.
To show the difference between the two stages, I use an interaction term of government
corruption and a dummy for firm operation from the third to fifth years after generating a positive
profit.
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The regression results are shown in Table 1.10. The coefficient for the interaction term is positive,
which means that as the level of corruption increases, firms that operate through the third to fifth
years after generating profit tend to avoid more tax compared with firms in the first two years after
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generating positive profit. The coefficient for the first two years is not significant because the tax rate
is zero, so the level of corruption will not influence firm tax avoidance. The estimated coefficient for
export is not significant, which means that firms will not take advantage of export for tax planning,
given that they enjoy a lower tax rate in China compared with other countries.
Given that some firms may use the first year’s profit to cover negative profit in previous
years, I do a robustness test using only the second year after generating profit. The fourth year is
a good represent for the third to fifth years. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.10 show the results using
year two as the base year and the interaction term corruption times dummy for the fourth year after
a firm generate positive profit. I get the same sign for the interaction term and the magnitude is
similar.
1.5 Robustness Tests
I conduct several robustness tests for the main results, and I discuss several aspects that for
future research.
1.5.1 Robustness Test: Balanced Sample
It possible that firms in the sample for only a few years hide more profit, which would bias
the results upward. Instead of using all the firm-year observations, I use only firms that are in the
sample for all 10 years of the sample period. In this way I omit from the sample the firms that had
just registered, those about to go bankrupt, and those that did not perform well for all 10 years.
Firms in the balanced panel may tend to hide less profit compared with other firms, perhaps because
they learned how to hide profit. If the coefficient on corruption is smaller compared with that for the
whole sample, that means more successful firms tend to hide less profit than less successful firms.
One way to explain this is that the reputation cost of being caught for these firms is high. The
regression results for a balanced sample are given in Table 1.11. The results are similar to those for
the main regression.
The firms in the balanced sample do relatively well on average, generating more than RMB
5 million in revenue from 1998 to 2007. The estimated coefficient on corruption for private firms is
lower compared with that for the main regression. The noncompliance rate is lower than that for
the whole sample. This may be because firms that are doing well care more about their reputation,
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so they won’t hide as much of their profit.
1.5.2 Robustness Test: Weighted Imputed Profit
The way imputed profit was calculated may be problematic, given that different firms may
have different depreciation rules and that output may sell in the next year. Therefore, I calculate
the weighted imputed profit by using weighted output and depreciation for the current year and the
previous year, I do this because the output may be allocated to the next year and will overstate the
output for the current year, and because the firms may use different depreciation methods, which
may understate or overstate the depreciation for tax avoidance purposes. To deal with this problem,
I assigned 90% weight to the current year and 10% weight to the previous year. This would mitigate
the problem of accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. The results are shown in Table 1.12.
1.5.3 Robustness Test: Two-Year Lagged Term for Corruption
It is also possible that a firm’s profit hiding behavior is influenced not only by the level of
corruption one year before but also by the level of corruption two years before. Therefore, the lagged
two year corruption is added so as to reflect the lasting impact of corruption. A firm’s profit hiding
behavior will respond to the level of corruption in the last two years, so the regression function will
be
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where β1 and β2 are coefficients for level of corruption Cp(t−1) and Cp(t−2) in year t − 1 and year
t − 2 in a province. The results are reported in Table 1.13. The coefficient for lagged two-year
corruption in a province shows a positive effective on profit hiding. Compared with the effect of
lagged corruption, the effect on profit hiding is lower for lagged two-year corruption. All of the
results for the main regression hold for lagged two-year corruption.
1.5.4 Robustness Test: Outliers
For the main regression, I use all of the observations with positive imputed profits. However,
outliers may have bias the results either upward or downward. Consequently, I delete observations
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for which the number of employees is smaller than 10. Since firms in the sample are manufacturing
firms, it is unlikely they have fewer than 10 employees. I also delete the top and bottom 0.5
percentiles of all of the key variables so as to avoid potential misreporting. After trimming the data,
I obtained results similar to those for the main regression. The results are reported in Table 1.14.
1.5.5 Robustness Test: With All Observations
In the main regression, I use only the observations with positive imputed profit, given that
firms don’t need to hide profit when they have negative profit. However, profit hiding is calculated
on the basis of imputed profit, which is an estimation of true profit. Moreover, firms may hide
profit if they consider they may want consistency with hiding profit in the future. Here I run the
main regression using all observations, those with both positive and negative imputed profits. The
regression results are shown in Table 1.15. The coefficient of corruption is lower for firms with
negative profit compared with firms with positive profits; that is, firms with positive profit tend to
hide more profit.
1.6 Conclusions
This study shows the impact of corruption on tax avoidance. The theoretical model shows
that higher government corruption levels and higher tax rates lead to higher corporate tax avoidance.
Then the theory is tested using firm level data on nearly 600,000 Chinese firms from 1998 to 2007.
The empirical results using firm fixed effect estimation, an instrumental variables approach, and a
difference-in-difference method provide strong evidence that a corrupt provincial government gives
firms an incentive to pay less corporate tax by . In particular, I show that one standard deviation
change in government corruption causes a more than 6% increase in tax avoidance. Robust and
consistent results are found by conducting several robustness tests.
After separating firms by type of ownership, I find that private firms hide more profit
compared with state-owned and foreign firms. Using a firm fixed effect model, I find that a higher
tax rate is correlated with higher tax avoidance. This result is confirmed taking advantage of the
natural experiment by comparing different periods of tax holidays given to foreign firms. Several
firm characteristics are also found to have an impact on a firm’s tax avoidance. As their assets
increase, firms tend to avoid more profit, but the noncompliance rate is lower for larger firms. Firms
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exporting from China tend to avoid more of their corporate income tax. For foreign firms, the age
of a firm also plays a role, in that as the age of the firm increases, the tax avoidance increases at a
decreasing rate.
These findings add to the literature on the determinants of tax avoidance and the unethical
behaviors of governments and firms. Fighting corruption is the top agenda for the current Chinese
administration. This paper suggests fighting corruption in local provinces may lead to higher tax
collection rates. Further, a lower tax rate will also reduce the amount of tax avoidance, so it is
possible that a lower tax rate along with fighting corruption may be optimal both for firms and
the government. Additionally, the general trends shown by firm characteristics, emphasized in this
paper, include the size of the firm, the age of the firm, and whether the firm exports from China,
can be utilized by the tax authorities when deciding what kinds of firms to inspect.
More generally, my estimation framework can be applied to other research questions. The
theoretical and empirical approach can be used to test firm level corruption on tax avoidance. One
important factor not considered here is the impact corruption has on a firm’s growth rate. If
corruption impedes growth, fighting local corruption may be even more important than this study
indicates. Alternatively, if corruption actually facilitates firm level growth, these results may be
diminished. This is a question left for further research.
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Table 1.1: Ownership
Year All Firms State Owned Private Foreign
1998 139,521 33.24 56.38 10.39
1999 148,433 30.67 58.01 11.31
2000 150,136 25.78 62.31 11.91
2001 157,165 20.45 66.55 13.00
2002 169,755 16.87 69.81 13.32
2003 188,485 12.83 73.13 14.04
2004 264,713 8.57 76.42 15.01
2005 263,914 6.65 78.07 15.29
2006 293,823 5.27 79.75 14.98
2007 331,500 3.55 81.67 14.78
This sample contains 2,068,867 observations.
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Table 1.2: Two-Digit Industries
Industry Freq Percent Cum
Coal Mining 35,214 1.91 1.91
Petroleum Extraction 926 0.05 1.96
Ferrous Mining 10,941 0.59 2.55
Nonferrous Mining 11,950 0.65 3.20
Nonmetal Mining 17,476 0.95 4.15
Other Mining 156 0.01 4.16
Timber Transportation 2,145 0.12 4.28
Agriculture and By-Product Processing 105,767 5.74 10.02
Food Production 42,802 2.32 12.34
Beverage Manufacturing 29,573 1.60 13.94
Tobacco Product 2,127 0.12 14.06
Textile 143,088 7.76 21.82
Garments Production 83,518 4.53 26.36
Leather Production 40,338 2.19 28.55
Timber Processing 34,532 1.87 30.42
Furniture Manufacturing 19,748 1.07 31.49
Paper Making 50,777 2.76 34.25
Printing 35,655 1.93 36.18
Cultural Education and Sports Product 22,531 1.22 37.40
Petroleum Processing 11,977 0.65 38.05
Raw Chemical Product 126,998 6.89 44.95
Medical Product 34,876 1.89 46.84
Chemical Fiber Product 9,032 0.49 47.33
Rubber Product 20,122 1.09 48.42
Plastic Product 78,932 4.28 52.70
Nonmetal Product 147,079 7.98 60.69
Ferrous Metal Smelting and Pressing 38,288 2.08 62.76
Nonferrous Metal Smelting and Pressing 31,814 1.73 64.49
Metal Production 96,525 5.24 69.73
Ordinary Machine Production 125,956 6.84 76.56
Special Equipment Production 71,179 3.86 80.43
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 76,162 4.13 84.56
Electric Equipment 61,130 3.32 87.88
Telecom and Electronic Production 73,223 3.97 91.85
Office Instrument and Machine Production 35,638 1.93 93.78
Art Production 29,924 1.62 95.41
Waste Recycle and Production 19,835 1.08 96.48
Electricity Production 41,225 2.24 98.72
Coal and Gas Production and Supply 3,246 0.18 98.90
Water Production and Supply 20,317 1.10 100.00
This sample contains 2,068,867 observations.
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Table 1.3: Variables and Description
Variables Description
PH Profit Hiding
CORRUPTION The one period lagged term of conviction per thousand employee
CORRUPTIONLAG The lagged term of CORRUPTION
TIE The connection between province and central political bureau
TAX The effective tax rate that firms actually faced for a given year
ASSETS Assets of the firm
EMPLOYEE Number of employees for the firm
EXPORT Dummy variable for whether firms export from China
AGE The number of years firms have been established
AGE2 Squared the number of years firms have been established
Dstate Dummy variable for state owned firms
Dprivate Dummy variable for private firms
Dforeign Dummy variable for Hongkong, Macao, Taiwan, and foreign firms
D2002 Dummy variable for firms established in or after 2002
D345 Dummy variable for foreign firms operated in third through fifth
year after they generated positive profit
D4 Dummy variable for foreign firms operated in fourth year after
they generated positive profit
CORRUPTION*D2002 The interaction term of CORRUPTION and D2002
CORRUPTION*D345 The interaction term of CORRUPTION and D345
CORRUPTION*D4 The interaction term of CORRUPTION and D4
Year dummy variables and industry dummy variables are not included
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Noncompliance Rate 0.291 0.521 -.825 4.521
Profit Hiding 5339.452 14435.5 -112345 987473
Conviction 1662.26 748.126 41 3881
Corruption 0.971 0.245 0.049 2.459
TAX 0.259 0.142 0.003 0.7499787
ASSETS 58780.78 255022.561 201 11925382
EMPLOYEE 236.369 561.711 12 20955
AGE 9.386 10.462 0 100
AGE2 197.555 502.601 0 10000
Dexport 0.258 0.438 0 1
Dstate 0.134 0.341 0 1
Dprivate 0.727 0.445 0 1
Dforeign 0.139 0.345 0 1



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Effect of Corruption on Profit Hiding—the IV Regression Second Stage
(1) (2)













Year Fixed Effect YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES
N 893550 893550
R2 0.007 0.032
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Year Fixed Effect YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES
N 893550 893550
R2 0.409 0.409
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Natural Experiment 2002
(1) (2)



















Year Fixed Effect YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES
N 918178 918178
R2 0.663 0.707
Robust standard errors in parentheses





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.10: Natural Experiment—Different Tax Rates for Foreign Firms
by Firm Age
Noncompliance Rate Profit Hiding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D345 D4 D345 D2
CORRUPTION 0.0177 0.0280 -993.8 -2094.1









EMPLOYEE -0.0226∗∗ -0.00853 4.730 11.83
(0.00880) (0.0220) (4.771) (15.00)
EXPORT 0.00386 0.00100 -258.9 1613.2
(0.0130) (0.0377) (722.1) (2631.5)
AGE 2.09∗∗ -1.32 588.7 -147.4
(0.997) (2.82) (673.2) (1813.7)
AGE2 -25.4∗∗∗ 12.7 -72.56 -25.74
(6.62) (20.6) (45.38) (151.7)
ASSETS 0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0367
(0.0138) (0.0289)
cons 0.0743 0.205 5592.7 6040.0
(0.289) (0.176) (4099.4) (11263.6)
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
N 76634 27823 76634 27823
R2 0.675 0.869 0.702 0.844
The dependent variable for column 1 through column 2 is noncompliance
rate, which is defined as profit hiding normalized by assets. The dependent
variable for column 3 through column 4 is profit hiding, which is the
measure for tax avoidance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Profit Hiding
Hiding Level.pdf














Figure 1.3: Profit Hiding/Assets
Hiding.pdf













































































Tax avoidance has long been an interesting topic for academia, accounting firms, and gov-
ernment regulators. There has been a large body of literature on the factors that influence tax
avoidance and the consequences of tax avoidance. Several papers have included Mexico in cross
country comparisons (Torgler, 2005; Christensen and Kapoor, 2004), but there is little research on
tax avoidance using Mexican firm level data. During the research period from 1984 to 1990, Mexico
went through trade liberalization and financial liberalization(Gelos and Werner, 2002; Mityakov,
2011), and the concentration of the economy changed significantly during these years. Therefore, it
is worthwhile to study the impact of market competition on tax avoidance.
Previous research on competition and tax avoidance using Chinese data shows that firms
tend to avoid more tax in more competitive industry (Cai and Liu, 2009). They argue that firms
tend to avoid more tax as to have more investment money when facing greater competition. Is
competition bad for the economy? Do these results fit other developing countries as well? A firm’s
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behavior needs to adjust to the economic environment in the country. It can be the case that firms
in more concentrated industries will hide more profit given that big firms tend to have better con-
nections with the government. Therefore, the degree of market competition in an economy might
influence a firm’s incentive to avoid tax. In this paper, we use data on Mexican manufacturing firms
to investigate the impact of market competition on tax avoidance.
The corporate tax rate in Mexico decreased over the sample period. The tax rate was 42%
for the years 1984-1986, then decreased to 40.6%, 39.2%, 37%, and 36% for 1987, 1988, 1989, and
1990, respectively. Besides the high tax rates, firms also need to share 10% of the profit with their
employees, because the high tax rate and profit sharing, firms take home less, they are more willing
to take risk, therefore the incentive to hide profit will be fairly strong.
The dataset used in this paper was collected by the Secretary of Trade and Industrial Pro-
motion. It contains annual panel data of Mexican manufacturing plants from 1984 to 1990. This
sample covers every Mexican manufacturing firm, excluding new or exiting establishments. After
cleaning up the data, we have a panel of 2325 firms over 7 years1. The data contain information
about the firm characteristics that can be found on balance sheets, cash flow statements, and income
statements.
In this paper, tax avoidance is measured by profit hiding, which is the difference between
imputed profits and reported profits2. Reported profit is generated according to the Mexican 10%
profit sharing rule. Imputed profit is calculated based on national income accounts, that is using
gross value of output minus intermediate inputs and other costs3.
We show that firms in more concentrated industries tend to hide more profits. This is dif-
ferent than the results using Chinese data (Cai and Liu, 2009). The effect of market competition is
economically and statistically significant for all of the competition measures, that’s including total
1In the regression, only firms with positive profit will be used due to the fact that reported profit is zero for firm
with zero or negative profits. The detailed information can be found in the data section.
2As to consider the size of the firm, the profit hiding measure is normalized by assets. Profit hiding, profit hiding
normalized by total cost, and profit hiding normalized by number of employee will be used as robustness tests.
3There are two ways to calculate imputed profit, I will follow Cai and Liu (2009) as to compare the results. I will
use another way used by Gelos and Werner (2002) and Mityakov (2011) as robustness tests. The correlation of the
two methods to calculate imputed profit is 0.95
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number of firm in the industry, the market share of top three firm, the market share of top four
firms, herfindahl index4, split sample Herfindahl index, and the industry average profit margin. The
results also significant when using different methods to calculate imputed profit as robustness tests.
Beside the main results, we also separate the firm into different groups by the size of the
firm and the ownership structure of the firm. We show that larger firms tend to avoid more taxes.
We find that firms with more than 50% Mexican capital tend to hide more profit compared to firms
with foreign capital. Solely Mexican owned firms avoid the most compared with the other three
groups. We also show that access to credit and total sales will also impact tax avoidance.
In the mean regression we use the number of firms in each industry and Herfindahl index in
each industry to measure concentration. However, using the Herfindahl index might bias the results
given that the share of the firm in consideration is used to calculate the Herfindahl index. As to deal
with this, we use split sample method along with basic OLS. We separate the firms into two groups
randomly and generate Herfindahl index for each group. We will use the Herfindahl index calculated
from the other sample as to overcome the endogeneity problem. We obtain similiar results, that tax
avoidance increases in more concentrated industries.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. This paper is the first study
to investigate how market competition affects a firm’s tax avoidance using Mexican manufacturing
plants information. It may shed light on how market structure influences tax avoidance in Latin
America. We find different results compared to research using Chinese data (Cai and Liu, 2009).
Therefore, there should be caution when applying policy suggestions based on the conclusion de-
rived using data from another country. Second, we also investigate more closely by separating the
firms into different groups according to plant size and ownership structure. Firms will adjust their
strategy according to their size and ownership structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and how we
construct the measure of market competition, tax avoidance and other variables. Section 3 presents
4The Herfindahl index calculated in the main regression is using the share of sales, whereas the one calculated
using gross value of output is used as a robust test.
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the empirical model and empirical results. Section 4 provides robustness tests. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2.2 Data and Variable Definition
2.2.1 Data Description
We use annual panel data of Mexican manufacturing plants from 1984 to 1990 collected by
the Secretary of Trade and Industrial Promotion. This data set includes all manufacturing plants
operating in Mexico, and as to maintain a balanced panel, new established plants and plants which
exit in the sample period are excluded from the sample. After cleaning the data, there are 13,891
plant year observations. Summary statistics of key variables are listed in Table 2.1.
These data provide information at the plant level. However, we cannot identify whether
different plants belong to the the same owner. So, we regard each plant as a separate firm in the
empirical exercises. The sample includes detailed information on revenue and cost. Some of the
variables used in this paper are capital cost, labor costs by types of labor, costs of intermediate
inputs, valued of production, sales, ownership structure, inventories, valued added taxes paid, and
other firm level variables.
Several cleaning procedures have been applied to the data. Plants with zero or negative
profit sharing were dropped due to the fact that if firm has negative reported profit the value of the
profit sharing will be zero, but this is not their true profit. Firms with fewer than three workers
and plants with zero levels of capital were dropped. Because we will use information on ownership
structure, we dropped plants without ownership information. This leaves us with a balanced panel
belonging to 126 classes of industrial activity. Still, this amounts to 80% of total value added in the
Mexican manufacturing sector. The data employ the Mexican Industrial Classification, which was
used before Mexico joined NAFTA in 1994 and adopted NAICS classification. This classification is
roughly comparable with the 4-digit ISIC rev. 2.0 industrial classification. We will generate compe-
titions measure based on the 4 digit industry. On average there are 20 plants per industry, although
there could be as many as 79 plants and as few as three plants per industry.
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2.2.2 Competition Variables
In this paper, we construct several measures for competition. In the main regression, we use
Herfindahl index as a measure of market competition. The Herfindahl index is the sum of squares of
markets share measured by sales by all firms in each industry5. The Herfindahl index is negatively
correlated with competition. Similar to Herfindahl index, we also construct the share of top three
firms and share of the top four firms. The share of the top three firms and the share of the top four
firms will be bigger if the industry is more concentrated, and thus, are highly correlated with the
Herfindahl index.
We also construct industry average profit margin, which is defined as the average ratio of
profit to total cost in a four digit industry. Average profit margin will fall if competition increases.
The number of firms in each industry is also used as an indicator for competition. The market is
more competitive as the number of firms increases. The number of firms in each industry is nega-
tively related to other competition measures used in this paper. Competition indices are constructed
for each of the 126 four digit manufacturing industries in Mexico. Table 2.2 shows the competition
indexes and average profit margin among other measures for 9 one digit industries.
2.2.3 Other Variables
Several other variables are also included in this paper. Natural log of the number of employ-
ees is included as a scale of the firm. Sales normalized by assets is also included. Credit measured as
the interest payment on debt is included to show the ability to access loans, which can be a measure
of financial conditions of the firm.
The ownership dummies are created based on the origin country of the capital. The sources
of capital are from Mexico, United States, Canada, Japan, Spain, Germany, and the rest of the
world. Dummies will be generated based on each of the there origin countries. The dummies will
take the value of one if majority of the social capital is from the above mentioned countries.
5Herfindahl index constructed using output will be used as robustness test.
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Geographical location may also influence the firm behavior given that states in the north
may face completion from United States. The connection with government officials will also be dif-
ferent for firms from different states. Therefore, we include state dummies to reflect location effects.
Year dummies are included to control for time varying effects.
2.2.4 Profit Measures
The reported profit is generated using the rule from the mandatory profit sharing in Mexico
that employers are required to distribute and pay 10% of their “adjusted” taxable income to em-
ployees. Thus, reported profit is 10 times the amount of profit sharing. The reported profit is zero
if firm has negative or zero profit6.
To estimate tax avoidance, the firm’s real profit is needed. However, knowing a firm’s true
profit is a challenge. There are two main ways to calculate imputed profit. In this paper we will
follow Cai and Liu (2009) as to compare the results with their Chinese data. Another way used
by Gelos and Werner (2002) and Mityakov (2011) will be used as robustness test. Cai and Liu
(2009) calculate tax avoidance by using the difference between imputed profit and reported profit.
Explicitly, imputed profit is generated by using the equation
ImputedProfitit = Outputit−Inputsit−Depreciationit−Financial Costit−Wageit−V ATit (2.1)
where Outputit is the value of total output of firm i in year t, Inputsit is total intermediate in-
puts, Depreciationit is current year depreciation, FinancialCostit is the interest payments on debt,
Wageit is total remunerations, and V ATit is the total value added tax paid by firm i in year t.
Profit hiding PHit is the difference between imputed profit and reported profit, defined as
ProfitHidingit = ImputedProfit−ReportedProfit (2.2)
Profit hiding can be viewed as a measure of tax avoidance. The more profit a firm hides, the less
6It is impossible to get the amount of profit a firm tries to hide if their reported profit is zero, so the observations
with zero or negative profit will be excluded from the analysis.
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taxes the firm ultimately pays.
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Empirical Model
The empirical model used in this paper is
ProfitHidingijt = β0 + β1Competitionjt + ΓXijt + αt + αo + αs + εijt (2.3)
ProfitHidingit, is profit hiding for firm i in industry j in year t. We normalize profit hiding by
assets in the main regression, while other profit hiding measures will be shown as robustness checks.
Competitionjt is the competition measure for industry j in year t. Competition measures in this
paper are Herfindahl index, Herfindahl, in each four digit industry and the number of firms in
each four digit industry, #offirms7. Xijt is a vector of firm characteristics for firm i in industry
j in year t. It includes the sales of firms, natural log of number of the firms, the access to credits.
αt is year fixed effect as to reflect the time varying effects., αo is ownership status, these dummies
are based on the origin of the capital. αs is state fixed effects, which will capture geographical effects.
2.3.2 Baseline Regressions
The results are shown in Table 2.3. The estimated coefficients of all alternative competition
measures are significant. Robust standard errors clustered by industry are shown in parentheses.
In Column (1), we show the results when using Herfindahl index as a measure for competition. We
show that a firm will avoid less tax in a more competitive market. These results are different than
the results from Cai and Liu (2009) using Chinese data. These results can be explained in the
following way. First, more concentrated industry means the share of several big firms dominates the
industry, and in Mexico the top firms tend to have connections with government officials. Therefore,
they will likely to bribe the officials as to pay less taxes. Second, in more competitive industries,
7Average profit margin in each industry, Eprofit, the share of top three firms in the industry, and the share of
top four firms in each industry will be used as robustness tests.
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firms will likely be similar in size. This would be easier for the tax authorities to compare the tax
forms across firms and the avoidance is more likely to be detected.
In Table 2.3 Column (3) and Column (4), we use the share of top three firms and share of
top four firms as measures of competition. The results are the same as using the Herfindahl index
shown in Column (1). Firms tend to avoid more taxes when several large firms control the majority
of the market share. This is consistent with the fact that the correlation between Herfindahl index
and share of top three or four firms is 0.9. In Column (5), the coefficient for the average profit
margin in the industry is positive, because competition is negatively correlated with average profit
margin. Therefore, in more competitive industries firms tend to avoid less profits. The estimated
coefficient on the number of firms in each industry is negative, which means firms tend to avoid
more taxes when there are less firms in the industriy.
2.3.3 Split Sample Regression
Using Herfindahl index as a measure may face endogeneity problems. The Herfindahl index
includes the firm in consideration, thus possibly biasing the results. As to deal with this potential
endogeneity problem, we use the split sample method. We separate the sample randomly into two
groups. Using the Herfindahl index calculated by the group not including the firm currently in
consideration as a measure of competition. The regression results are reported in Table 2.2 Column
(2). The estimated coefficient is significant and have same sign as baseline regression, meaning the
baseline results hold when we use split sample method.
2.3.4 Ownership and Tax Avoidance
Domestic and foreign firms may act differently when considering tax avoidance. Domestic
firms may have more connections with government officials. Multinational firms are also likely to
get audited by their home country. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the impact of owner-
ship structure on tax avoidance. We separate the firms into four groups based on the percentage
of capital owned by Mexican capital. The four groups are Solely Mexican controlled firms(100%
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Mexican), firms with more than half of Mexican capital(>50% Mexican capital), firms with less
than half of Mexican capital(<50% Mexican capital), and sole foreign capital controlled firms(0%
Mexican capital).
The regression results when using Herfindahl index as competition measure are shown in
Table 2.4. From Table 2.4 we can see that domestically controlled firms, solely Mexican controlled
firms, shown in Column (1) and more than half of the capital from Mexican shown in Column (2),
avoid more taxes. Market competition has no significant effects on tax avoidance for foreign con-
trolled firms, less than half capital from Mexico or solely foreign controlled firms. Due to the the
fact that foreign firms also face the investigation of their own country, and therefore, due to the
enforcement from two sides, their incentive to hide profits is weaker.
We also show the results using split sample Herfindahl and the number of firms in each four
digits industry as measures of competition. The results are the same as using the Herfindahl index.
The results using split sample Herfindahl index are shown in Table 2.5, and the results using the
number of firms in each four digits industries are show in Table 2.6. Competition in the market only
impacts the tax avoidance of domestic firms, while no pattern shows up for foreign controlled firms.
2.3.5 Firm Size and Tax Avoidance
Large firms tend to have more connections with the government, so they may bribe tax
authority and avoid more tax, while it is also possible that larger firms will be a greater target for
the tax authority. Therefore, how does the size of the firm influence tax avoidance is one practical
question. We measure plant size based on the number of employees. Plants are classified as Large,
Medium, Small, and Very small, if total employment is greater than 500 people, between 100 and
500 people, between 40 and 100 people, and less than 40 people, respectively.
The results in Table 2.7 show that larger firms tend to avoid more taxes. Large firms hide
more than twice as much profits as medium size firms. Very small firms also avoid tax given the
fact that it is hard for tax authority to investigate these firms. As to get detailed information on
what the impact of ownership structure and plant size has on tax avoidance, we separate the sample
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by both plant size and ownership structure into eight groups: very small solely Mexican controlled
firms, very small firm with foreign capital, small solely Mexican controlled firms, small firms with
foreign capital, medium solely Mexican controlled firms, medium size firm with foreign capital, large
solely Mexican controlled firms, and large firm with foreign capital. The regression results are shown
in Table 2.8. We show that both large and very small solely Mexican controlled firms avoid taxes,
while medium sized firm with foreign capital avoid taxes. There is no effects on other specifications.
2.4 Robustness Tests
We conduct the following robustness tests for the main results.
2.4.1 Robustness Test: Alternative Way to Compute True Profit
The way to calculate true profit varies. In this section we use the method used by Gelos
and Werner (2002) and Mityakov (2011) as a robustness test. The imputed profit is calculated as
the gross value of output plus industrial and nonindustrial service income less total cost and value
added tax.
ImputedProfitit = Outputit + Industrial Serviceit +Nonindustrial Serviceit − TCit − V ATit
(2.4)
This way to calculate imputed profit differs from the first method because of the following compo-
nents: Outputit is the value of output plus the value of capital produced for own use. The value of
capital produced for own use includes machinery and equipment produced for own use, construction
and install assets for own use, transportation equipment for own use, and other assets produced for
own use.
Total cost, TCit, is computed as the sum of labor costs, costs of intermediate inputs, value
of energy consumed, cost of industrial service, total non-industrial costs and capital costs. Total
material costs includes raw materials consumed, packaging materials, fuels, and spare parts. Total
cost of industrial services includes repair and maintenance, subcontractors, and other services. Total
non-industrial costs includes sales commissions, royalties, advertising costs, and etc. Capital cost is
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computed as the sum of rental/leasing costs plus 10% of capital valued at replacement cost.
The regression results are show in Table 2.9, the results for all of the competition measures
are consistent with the results in Table 2.3, that means the completion has impact on tax avoidance
for the imputed profits calculated using both ways.
2.4.2 Robustness Test: Alternative Measures of Profit Hiding
Profit hiding used in the main regression is normalized by assets of the company. One might
argue that other ways to normalize profit hiding may change the results. As to check the robustness
of the results, we show the results using profit hiding, profit hiding normalized by the number of
employees, and profit hiding normalized by total cost as measures of tax avoidance.
Table 2.10 shows the regression results. The estimated coefficients of all three specifications
have the same signs as the baseline regression, lending further evidence that firms tend to avoid
more taxes in less competitive markets. All other competition measures are also consistent with the
baseline regression. The results also hold when using different ways to calculate imputed profits8.
2.4.3 Robustness Test: Reported and Imputed Profits
There may be concerns about using the gap between imputed profit and reported profit as
profit hiding is not appropriate. As to deal with this, we use the the following regression











We use interaction terms of imputed profit and competition measures as well as other control vari-
able with imputed profits as explanatory variables. In this setting as long as the imputed profit
is positively correlated with true profit, we can get the sensitivity on the impact of competition
8The results are available upon request.
56
measures on reported profit given certain true profit.
In equation (5), the competition measure will be the same as the main regression. Control
variables including natural log of the number of employees, financials costs, and sales of the firms.
Year dummies, ownership structure dummies, and location dummies are included as well. In this
equation we care most about the sign of β1, which is the interaction term of imputed profits and
competition. For example, if we use the Herfindahl index as competition measure, if β1 is positive
that means at a given imputed profit, firms in more competitive industries will report more profit.
That is, firm will avoid less taxes.
The regression results are show in Table 2.11. The results when using the Herfindahl index
are shown in Column (1), the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of competition and im-
puted profit is negative, that is, in more concentrated industries, firms tend to report less profits.
These results match the results we obtained by using the the gap between imputed profit and are
reported in the main regression. Same results are obtained by using split sample Herfindahl index,
the market share of top three firm, and the market share of top four firms. The sign for the number
of firms in the industry is also consistent with the main regression, that when the number of firms
in the industry increase, given imputed profit, firms tend to report more profits.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that firms in relatively more competitive industries avoid less taxes.
We also find that larger firms tend to avoid more taxes. As for ownership structure, Mexican
controlled firms hide more profit, while there is no significant results for foreign controlled firms.
Specifically, when we consider both plant size and ownership structure, we show that domestically
controlled very small firms and domestically controlled large firms tend to hide more profits.
Contrary to the results using Chinese data by Cai and Liu (2009), we show that competi-
tion is good for the market from the perspective of tax collecting. Competitive market will help tax
authority to monitor the firms. It is easier for tax authority to regulate similar firms in the industry
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by just comparing their financial sheets. While for more concentrated markets, the top firms may
collude with each other or more easily bribe government officials to pay less tax.
Our empirical results, along with Cai and Liu (2009), should show that one policy imple-
mented in one country cannot directly used in other countries. The results in this paper illustrate
that tax authorities or other government officials need to improve tax enforcement by auditing larger
firms. Because our results suggests that larger firms hide more profits. We know that competitive
market arguably good for economy, our results suggests additional merit that ensuring stronger
competition might lead to higher tax collection rates.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Gross Output 24653.362 81396.229 20 2311345
Reported Profit Margin 2324.329 9391.5 10 279320
Imputed Profit 3704.995 22078.836 -304273 615874
Total Employment 317.755 490.639 4 10065
Ln Employment 5.127 1.125 1.386 9.217
Value of Output 24638.365 81350.697 20 2311345
Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.131 0.022 0.998
Herfindahl Group1 0.244 0.192 0 1
Herfindahl Group2 0.25 0.195 0 1
Average Profit 0.085 0.167 -5.92 1.615
Share of Top 3 Firms 0.501 0.205 0.129 1
Share of Top 4 Firms 0.575 0.211 0.164 1
# of Firms 28.554 19.129 2 79
N 13,891

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Competition and Tax Avoidance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













sales 0.0698 0.0698 0.0697 0.0697 0.0697 0.0698
(0.0945) (0.0945) (0.0945) (0.0945) (0.0945) (0.0944)
lnlabor -0.989 -1.051* -1.031* -1.021* -0.999* -1.172**
(0.602) (0.611) (0.596) (0.600) (0.601) (0.594)
credit 1.201* 1.201* 1.201* 1.201* 1.201* 1.201*
(0.680) (0.680) (0.680) (0.680) (0.680) (0.680)
cons 7.411* 7.831* 5.125 5.125 7.485* 13.24***
(4.448) (4.438) (4.756) (4.563) (4.484) (4.906)
N 8377 8377 8377 8377 8377 8377
R2 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 1 is Herfindahl index, Column 2 is split smile Herfindahl index, Column 3 is total share of top
four firms, Column 4 is total share of top three firms, Column 5 is average profit margin, Column 6 is
the number of firms in the industry.
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Table 2.4: Ownership and Tax Avoidance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100% Mexican >50% Mexican >0% Mexican Foreign with Foreign
herfindahl 21.18** 7.475* -1.284 -6.743 9.182
(8.475) (4.320) (11.69) (42.40) (12.53)
sales 0.0909*** 0.00358 -0.0606*** 0.00803 -0.00670
(0.00284) (0.00610) (0.00661) (0.0128) (0.00685)
lnlabor -0.235 1.764*** 0.199 -10.21** -2.137
(0.959) (0.620) (1.549) (4.822) (1.626)
credit 1.036*** -0.206 -0.733*** 3.904** -1.512***
(0.0280) (0.155) (0.198) (1.941) (0.266)
cons 2.548 -10.28 3.587 135.3 11.20
(13.81) (10.37) (13.00) (89.55) (36.92)
N 6298 1027 344 708 2079
R2 0.741 0.047 0.852 0.023 0.043
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Ownership and Tax Avoidance(Split Sample Method)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100% Mexican >50% Mexican >0% Mexican Foreign with Foreign
herfindahlc 11.31** 7.893*** -3.021 8.951 9.582
(5.407) (2.878) (5.525) (19.26) (7.175)
sales 0.0909*** 0.00297 -0.0605*** 0.00804 -0.00672
(0.00284) (0.00610) (0.00660) (0.0128) (0.00685)
lnlabor -0.303 1.611*** 0.148 -10.27** -2.178
(0.960) (0.623) (1.499) (4.813) (1.620)
credit 1.036*** -0.184 -0.733*** 3.791* -1.512***
(0.0280) (0.155) (0.198) (1.940) (0.266)
cons 2.781 -10.08 4.666 46.93 10.60
(13.81) (10.34) (13.15) (82.53) (36.91)
N 6298 1027 344 708 2079
R2 0.741 0.052 0.852 0.023 0.044
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Ownership and Tax Avoidance(# of Firms in the Industry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100% Mexican >50% Mexican >0% Mexican Foreign with Foreign
numclase -0.169*** -0.0893** 0.0887 0.234 -0.00232
(0.0556) (0.0379) (0.0656) (0.250) (0.0901)
sales 0.0910*** 0.00331 -0.0602*** 0.00848 -0.00668
(0.00284) (0.00610) (0.00659) (0.0128) (0.00685)
lnlabor -0.557 1.473** 0.386 -9.982** -2.009
(0.966) (0.637) (1.505) (4.819) (1.646)
credit 1.035*** -0.194 -0.742*** 4.108** -1.507***
(0.0280) (0.155) (0.197) (1.946) (0.266)
cons 12.57 -5.805 1.009 53.74 11.58
(14.04) (10.50) (13.11) (81.99) (37.11)
N 6298 1027 344 708 2079
R2 0.741 0.050 0.853 0.024 0.043
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Firm Size and Tax Avoidance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Small Small Medium Large
herfindahl 6.425* 6.684 9.298** 23.88**
(3.319) (5.347) (4.366) (11.17)
sales -0.0363 0.0330 -0.0824 0.213***
(0.0401) (0.0481) (0.0714) (0.0489)
lnlabor 0.226 0.204 1.217 2.374
(1.069) (1.920) (1.116) (3.271)
credit -0.855* -1.076*** -0.531 0.000605
(0.491) (0.292) (0.927) (0.364)
cons -1.498 -0.892 -6.921 -13.21
(3.615) (8.456) (7.180) (22.40)
N 872 2032 4064 1409
R2 0.247 0.131 0.243 0.879
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are
reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 is for firms with 3-40 works, Column 3 is for firms
with 40-100 works , Column 4 is for firms with 100-500 works,





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9: Robustness Test: Alternative Way to Calculate Imputed Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













salesoutput -2.796 -2.696 -2.830 -2.844 -3.082* -2.723
(2.108) (2.167) (2.101) (2.088) (1.842) (2.179)
lnlabor -0.578 -0.599 -0.650 -0.627 -0.568 -0.841
(1.055) (1.076) (1.047) (1.046) (1.056) (1.111)
credit 2.417*** 2.417*** 2.417*** 2.417*** 2.417*** 2.417***
(0.578) (0.579) (0.578) (0.578) (0.578) (0.579)
cons 6.986 7.024 3.376 3.671 7.711 15.25*
(7.327) (7.114) (7.789) (7.806) (7.201) (8.610)
N 8377 8377 8377 8377 8377 8377
R2 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.671
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 1 is Herfindahl index, Column 2 is split smile Herfindahl index, Column 3 is total share of top
four firms, Column 4 is total share of top three firms, Column 5 is average profit margin, Column 6 is
the number of firms in the industry.
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Table 2.10: Robustness Test: Alternative Ways of Profit Hiding
(1) (2) (3)
Profit Hiding/Population Profit Hiding/Costs Profit Hiding
herfindahl 17.62*** 0.123*** 4590.9**
(3.472) (0.0286) (1843.1)
sales 0.00275* 0.00000856 2.047*
(0.00152) (0.00000752) (1.152)
lnlabor -0.121 0.0152*** -73.98
(0.297) (0.00323) (338.9)
credit -0.0101 -0.0000265 9.165
(0.0134) (0.0000670) (8.391)
cons -1.270 -0.0375 -243.7
(3.788) (0.0739) (2131.8)
N 8377 8377 8377
R2 0.068 0.037 0.092
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 1 is profit hiding normalized by number of employee, Column 2 is profit
hiding normalized by total cost, Column 3 is profit hiding.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Test: Alternative Way to Calculate Imputed Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























credit*imputed 0.000156*** 0.000236*** 0.000160*** 0.000157*** 0.000249*** 0.000199
(8.70e-06) (8.24e-06) (8.39e-06) (8.60e-06) (8.10e-06) (0.000122)
lnlabor*imputed -0.168*** -0.256*** -0.152*** -0.192*** -0.0759*** -0.0644
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0146) (0.0661)
sales*imputed 2.95e-05*** 2.47e-05*** 3.02e-05*** 3.36e-05*** 8.22e-06*** 1.22e-05
(1.86e-06) (1.89e-06) (1.83e-06) (1.87e-06) (1.99e-06) (1.62e-05)
profit2a 1.021* 1.113** 1.773*** 1.758*** -0.0267 -0.669
(0.549) (0.563) (0.543) (0.548) (0.553) (0.415)
credit -0.896*** -1.141*** -0.796*** -0.837*** -1.152*** -0.752***
(0.0630) (0.0633) (0.0626) (0.0631) (0.0620) (0.287)
lnlabor 0.525* 0.678** 0.512* 0.575* 0.138 0.355*
(0.307) (0.315) (0.303) (0.306) (0.310) (0.214)
sales 0.153*** 0.167*** 0.137*** 0.144*** 0.155*** 0.129***
(0.00254) (0.00251) (0.00267) (0.00263) (0.00255) (0.0196)
Constant -3.402 -3.826 -4.785 -4.709 0.0232 -0.561
(4.813) (4.930) (4.790) (4.824) (4.839) (1.198)
Observations 8,377 8,377 8,377 8,377 8,377 8,377
R-squared 0.841 0.833 0.845 0.842 0.839 0.849
Robust standard errors adjusting for industry clusters are reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 1 is Herfindahl index, Column 2 is split smile Herfindahl index, Column 3 is total share of top four firms, Col-
umn 4 is total share of top three firms, Column 5 is average profit margin, Column 6 is the number of firms in the industry.
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Corruption: Evidence from China
3.1 Introduction
According to the World Bank, corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private
gain. Corruption is a widespread phenomenon seen in both developing and developed countries. In
China corruption exists in nearly every level of government. According to Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index, China has been ranked between 72nd and 78th out of 178
countries in recent years. Corruption can have a variety of forms. Graft and rent seeking are the
the most common forms in China (Lu, 2000)1.
Fiscal decentralization, in which the central government relinquishes fiscal controls to provin-
cial level governments, helps to increase economic efficiency. Local governments are better positioned
for provincial regulation and providing of public services than the national government because an
information advantage (Oates, 1972). In this paper, therefore, I use the number of competing gov-
ernments as an indicator of fiscal decentralization. The greater the number of jurisdictions, the
better the government is positioned for providing public goods and also giving residents more avail-
able choices.
1Graft involves something of value given to, and accepted by, public officials for dishonest or illegal purposes.
Rent-seeking refers to all forms of corrupt behavior by people with monopolistic power (Lu, 2000).
72
Being able to answer the question what are the causes of corruption is important. Fiscal
decentralization as an main feature of economic structure will impact the level of corruption. In this
paper I present a theoretical model that shows how fiscal decentralization can prevent corruption
in China. I then empirically examine the effects of fiscal decentralization on corruption in local
government in China. Unlike previous cross-country research, this paper only focuses on China,
thereby reducing concerns about unobservable heterogeneity. I use three proxies for corruption and
two fiscal decentralization measurements. The corruption measures are number of convictions in
each province, the number of audit reports for each province, and transparency score. I find that
fiscal decentralization in government expenditure and government revenue are consistently associ-
ated with lower levels of corruption.
Section 2 provides some basic background information on fiscal decentralization in China
and the literature on corruption and fiscal decentralization. Section 3 presents a theoretical model
that links fiscal decentralization and corruption. Section 4 describes the data and how I construct
my measure of corruption and fiscal decentralization and empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Background and Literature Review
3.2.1 China’s Current Fiscal System
From 1994 to the present, a tax sharing system has been used in China. There are five levels
of government in China. The central government, and four levels of local governments. The four
subnational governments are provincial level governments, prefectural level governments, country
level governments, and town level governments. China is fiscally decentralized on both the revenue
side and the expenditure side.
The tax sharing system institutes that some taxes belong to central government, some
taxes belong to subnational governments, and some taxes are shared by central and subnational
governments. Central taxes include tariffs and the consumption tax. Local taxes include resource
taxes, urban maintenance and development taxes, urban land-use taxes, agriculture and related
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taxes2, taxes on contracts, taxes on the use of arable land, vehicle purchase taxes and other local
taxes. Shared taxes include value-added tax(Central: %75, Local: %25), business tax (Central:
%5, Local: %95), stamp tax on security exchange (Central: %97, Local: %3), personal income tax
(Central: %60, Local: %40) and corporate income tax (Central: %60, Local: %40). From Table 3.1
we can see that about 50 percent of the entire public revenue was generated at the sub-national level.
The tax sharing system mainly focus on revenue sharing, but didn’t change the responsi-
bility of different levels of governments. The assignments of responsibilities as follow: the central
government is responsible for national defense, spending on education, health, technology, foreign
affairs, and other national service. The subnational governments are responsible for basically the
same as central government according but focus more on local levels. Subnational governments
delivers local public goods and services, the development of the local economy. We can see from
Table 3.2 that the share of public expenditure at the sub-national level increased from 50% to 80%
of total government spending from 1980 to 2009.
The difference between subnational governments expenditure and revenue are from inter-
governmental transfer program. It is main resources for local governments, especially those less
developed provinces. There are two types of intergovernmental grants, one is categorical grant,
which should be used for specific projects. Another type is unrestricted grants, which can be used
for general purpose.
3.2.2 Literature Review
A number of scholars have estimated the relationship between corruption and decentraliza-
tion empirically using cross country data produced by Transparency International and the World
Bank. Some scholars have used firm-level survey data about firm’s concrete experiences with bribery.
The findings of these studies have been mixed.
Some scholars argue that fiscal decentralization has helped reduce corruption. Fisman and
Gatti (2002a) find that fiscal decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and signifi-
2Chinese government abolished agriculture related taxes starting from 2006 for all regions.
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cantly associated with lower corruption level by looking at the cross country relationship between
fiscal decentralization and corruption, as measured by a number of different indices. Similar results
have been found by other researchers (Huther and Shah, 1998; De Mello and Barenstein, 2001)
Some studies, however, have offered evidence suggesting that fiscal decentralization may
also lead to poor accountability and governance (Fukasaku and De Mello, 1999). A weak central
government allows various governmental agencies and bureaucracies to impose independent bribes
on private agents seeking complementary permits from these agencies. When the entry of these
agencies into regulation is free, that will increase the cumulative bribe burden or corruption level
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Another argument is that lower level governments, although having
some degree of autonomy, compete with each other in rent seeking from higher level governments
which have the rights of assignments. Governments may compete with each other to attract capital
by promising corrupt benefits to local business at the expense of the central government (Cai and
Treisman, 2004). The fear of losing mobile capital may worsen the corrupt situation (Cai and Treis-
man, 2005).
The above mentioned papers use cross country data sets, but when countries have different
institutions, maybe they are political decentralized or maybe they have a centralized political system.
It is questionable to use cross country data sets to test the effects of fiscal decentralization on corrup-
tion. Goel and Nelson (2011) examine the influence of government decentralization on corruption
in the United States and they show that government decentralization does not necessarily reduce
corruption. Instead they show that the corruption level depends on the type of decentralization.
By looking at government transfers, Fisman and Gatti (2002b) find that the rate of prosecutions
for the abuse of public office is greater in states with higher transfers. Unlike the former research
focus on cross country studies which neglect country specific background or only use the data from
a developed country, in this paper I use a data set of Chinese provinces to test the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and corruption in a developing country.
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3.3 The Theoretical Model
In this section, I present a simple model to help understand the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and corruption.
3.3.1 Players and Preference
Players in this model include Chinese provincial level governments, residents and firms.
The Chinese provincial level governments, according to the government officer evaluations
system, would like their jurisdiction to have more GDP, which could help them be promoted to a
national level government or higher position. They also care about corruption earnings which they
could get from rent seeking. Officials care about the number of residents and the number of firms,
since more residents can lead to more individual income tax revenue and more firms mean more
corporate income tax revenue. According to China’s taxation law, provincial level governments re-
ceive 40% of both individual income tax revenue and corporate income tax revenue. The provincial
government would like to provide more public goods for two reasons. The first is that providing
public goods can attract more residents who move into the area. The second is that by deciding
who implements public goods projects, they could get bribe money from the procurement of public
goods due to incomplete inspections.
According to tax law, the tax rate for residents is the same throughout the whole country.
Residents choose the province that can provide them with relatively better public goods and services,
i.e. more bang for their buck.
Like residents, firms face the same tax rate throughout the whole country. However, firms
can bargain with local governments and try to get more tax deductions or pay lower fees for using
land. Note that big firms would get more chances since they could not only provide more tax rev-
enue, but they also bring more work opportunities which attracts more people. For example, when
Volkswagen planned to open another plant in China, they first thought about the Jilin province,
where they could have gotten more deductions for new investment according to the new tax policy.
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However, Shanghai offered a lower Value Added Tax rate via subsidy in order to get Volkswagen to
build the plant there.
3.3.2 Timing and Action
First, provincial governments set a spending schedule and decide how to spend their tax rev-
enue. Governments set policies and regulation to try to get more money from residents and private
firms. This cannot be too high, or firms would switch to other provinces. They also decide how much
the firms need to pay for using land, since the land in China is owned by the government. Because
they have monopoly power over land, they can decide how much they will charge to maximize their
own utility.
Next, residents decide which province to work and live in according to their utility, which
is a function of public goods. Private firms decide where to invest by comparing the price of land
and the real tax rate. Firms may pay much less in one province than in another by bribing related
government officers. Both firms and residents can bribe government officials to try and bend the
rules. This is a bargaining process, decided by the elasticity of the supply, that is the substitutability
of governments.
3.3.3 Model Setup
To formalize preferences, timing and action, I follow Arikan (2004) use the following theo-
retical model to show the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption:
There are N local governments that try to compete with each other, and each local area
has p residents. The function for producing private goods is F (ki), where ki is the investment of
a representative firm in region i. The production function is increasing and concave; i.e., F ′ > 0,
F ′′ < 0. Each unit of capital is rented on a capital market throughout the whole country at the
net return to capital denoted by ρ. Since province i levies a unit tax on capital at rate ti, after tax
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profit of the firm located in province i is
πi = F (ki)− (ρ+ ti)ki (3.1)
The first order condition of profit maximization is
F ′(ki)− ti = ρ (3.2)
Residents care about their consumption of private goods and public goods, denoted as
H(xi, gi), where x and g are private goods and public goods respectively. Marginal utility of one
good is increasing in the consumption of the other good. The private good consumption is financed
by a resident’s capital gains and labor income. Suppose residents have k0 as their endowment, their
gain from capital is the rate of return times endowment, that is (F ′(ki)−ti)k0. As a worker, residents
receive wage income F (ki)− kiF ′(ki), thus the private consumption can be expressed as
xi = (F
′(ki)− ti)k0 + F (ki)− kiF ′(ki) = F (ki)− (ki − k0)F ′(ki)− tik0 (3.3)
Government cares about both the utility of residents and what they can get from rent
seeking, I use ci to denote corruption. Thus the objective function of government can be expressed
as
αH(xi, gi) + (1− α)ci (3.4)
where α is a number between 0 and 1. The tax revenue gathered by government is used for providing
public goods as well as corrupt earning, so we have the tax revenue constraint that
tiki = gi + ci (3.5)
Therefore, the government objective function can be expressed as
G(ti, ci|N) = αH(xi, gi) + (1−α)ci = αH(F (ki)− (ki−k0)F ′(ki)− tik0, tiki− ci) + (1−α)ci (3.6)
The reason why I put N here is because, as mentioned in section 1, N is the number of competing
governments, thus an indicator of fiscal decentralization. If I can show that as N increases, corrup-
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tion c decreases, then I could conclude that fiscal decentralization reduces the corruption level. Real
tax rate and corruption are both functions of N , because these two variables change along with the
number of governments. This is another reason why N is in the government objective function.
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(3.8)
























in this equation ∂t∂N should be negative, since as the number of governments increase, there will
be competition about the tax rate. Thus, what I need to show is that
αHxk0−αHgki
(1−α)−αHg is greater
than 0, which means that to get fiscal decentralization to reduce the corruption level the following
assumption must be true
(1− α)− αHg > 0 (3.11)
This means that the government cares more about corruption revenue than they do about providing
public goods.
Also,
αHxk0 − αHgki > 0 (3.12)
which needs Hx > Hg, meaning that residents care more about their private consumption than their
public good consumption.
Given these reasonable assumptions, it can be proven that fiscal decentralization reduce the level of
corruption.
As will be shown in the next section, fiscal decentralization is usually expressed as the
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subnational share of total government spending, so fiscal decentralization, FD, can be expressed as




















This partial derivative is negative, which means fiscal decentralization and corruption are negatively
correlated.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Measurement of Fiscal Decentralization
Because of the complexity of decentralization, namely political centralization and economic
decentralization, the way in which to measure fiscal decentralization is a widely debated topic. Lin
and Liu (2000) measure the degree of fiscal decentralization by a marginal retention rate, the rate
at which revenue increments are retained by provincial governments. Zhang and Zou (1998) use
the subnational share of total government spending as a measure of fiscal decentralization. China’s
decentralization has taken place on both the revenue side and the expenditure side of the budget,
so as to fully test how different measurement may affect the results, I use the expenditure side and
the revenue side as the measurements of fiscal decentralization.
Fiscal decentralization using expenditures will be defined as the share of provincial fiscal







where FDexpit stands for the measurement of fiscal decentralization using expenditure for province i
in year t, PEit stands for fiscal expenditure for province i in year t, NEt stands for national fiscal
expenditure in year t, pit stands for the province population in year t, and pt stands for national
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population in year t.
Fiscal decentralization using revenue will be defined as the share of province fiscal revenue







where FDrevit stands for the measurement of fiscal decentralization using revenue for province i in
year t, PRit stands for fiscal revenue for provine i in year t, and NRt stands for national fiscal
revenue in year t.
3.4.2 Measurement of Corruption
The primary challenge of this empirical research is that the measurement of corruption is
illicit and secretive. If we cannot get accurate measurements of corruption, it will be hard to get per-
suasive results of the effects of fiscal decentralization on corruption. Lots of different measurements
have been used. These measurements are the corruption rating data sets provided by Transparency
International and the World Bank. International Country Risk Guide, which is published by Po-
litical Risk Service, has also been used. These data include corruption perceptions index, bribe
payers index, global corruption report and more. Fan (2007) constructed two measure of corruption,
bribe frequency and bribe amount. However, these data sets rely on the aggregated perceptions of
businessmen or country experts, many of whom may have formed impressions based on common
press depictions.
Since there is no consensus about an appropriate indicator of corruption, it is especially
hard for researchers to get provincial level data. I will use the following three proxies of corruption
to test the effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption. First, the number of convictions for the
abuse of public office in a province can be a proxy of corruption (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Goel and
Nelson, 2011). The reason why I use this number as an indicator is that each province is likely to
have the same rates of catching corrupt activity given that the inspections are conducted following
the same rules in China. Second, the number of auditing reports for provincial governments serves as
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a proxy for corruption. More auditing reports means more corruption in the province. Third, I use
the level of government transparency score as a proxy for the corruption level. Higher government
transparency score means that the provincial level governments share more government expenditures
information with the general public. Therefore, higher government transparency scores tend to reflect
less corruption.
3.4.3 The Data
The data I use in this paper come from a variety of sources. The number of convictions for
the abuse of public office in a province came from the provincial reports in Chinese Procuratorial
Yearbook from 2000 to 2009. I collected the number of auditing reports for provincial governments
from the Chinese Auditing Yearbook. I found government transparency scores in the Provincial
Transparency Report. The data source for remaining variables is the China Statistical Yearbook.
A number of other variables are shown in the regression, besides the proxies for corruption
and measurements of fiscal decentralization. I use the share of imports and exports on GDP to
proxy for openness (Openness) as suggested by Ades and Di Tella (1997). Per capita GDP (GDP
per Capita) is used as the level of economic development. Total provincial government expenditure
as a fraction of GDP can be used as an indicator for the size of government (Government Size). I
use the ratio of wage of government officials to average provincial wage as a measurement of relative
wage (Relative Wage). Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.3.
The data set I use in this paper contains information from 1998 to 2007. During the
first five years and second five years China has different central government leaders. Therefore, I
included change of leaders (Leader) as a dummy variable. Since China is a big country, geographic
and economic conditions usually are not the same, so I include the dummy variables, Costal and
Central, if the province is located in the coastal area and the central region respectively. The three




To examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption I use the following empirical
regression model.
cit = β + γFDit + δXit + εi + εit (3.17)
where cit is corruption level, FDit is fiscal decentralization, Xit is the vector of explanatory vari-
ables, that is relative wage, openness, government size, population, GDP per capita and dummy
variables. εi and εit are error terms.
3.4.5 Empirical Results
Table 3.4 reports the coefficients and standard errors when the number of convictions for
abuse of public office is the dependent variable. My estimation shows that fiscal decentralization and
corruption are negatively correlated, indicating that greater decentralization reduces corruption. For
example, using expenditure as a measure of fiscal decentralization, 1 percentage point increase in
fiscal decentralization in expenditure lowers the total number of corruption crime by 0.3226 percent.
The negative sign on openness suggests that the openness of an economy is inversely related to the
level of corruption. Because I use the import and export share of GDP as indicator of openness,
that means the provinces involved more in international trade are tend to be less corrupted. The
sign for relative wage is also negative, which implies that low salaries for public officials gives them
an incentive to engage in dishonest activity to try to get extra money.
The result of the dummy variable of leader is particularly interesting. I find that leader is
negatively correlated with the corruption and the results are significant. This is reasonable given
that the top leader in the first five years was famous for dealing with corruption. That means that
even though China has a decentralized fiscal system, the top leader could still influence corruption.
Table 3.5 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors when using the number of
auditing reports as a proxy for corruption. The coefficients for fiscal decentralization in government
expenditure and government revenue are all negative and significant. This further supports the view
that higher fiscal decentralization leads to a lower level of corruption.
83
The notable feature of this table is that the signs of the coastal and central dummy variables
are negative. The estimated coefficient for coastal is about -0.9 and -0.3 for central. This means
that compared with western China, provinces in central China have lower levels of corruption and
that the corruption level in the coastal provinces is even lower.
The results when using government transparency scores as a dependent variable are shown in
Table 3.6. The coefficients for fiscal decentralization using government expenditures and government
revenue show different signs and are not significant. My potential explanation is that government
transparency score may not be a good proxy. Because the institution that collects this information
only reports a total score, the government officials can give the information they are most comfortable
to share. Furthermore, the institution that does this project cannot prove the authenticity of the
information.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I show both theoretically and empirically that there is a negative relationship
between fiscal decentralization and corruption. The empirical part is tested using a panel data set of
31 provinces from 1998 to 2007 in China. My estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in govern-
ment expenditure and government revenue conducive to prevent corruption. By incorporate leader
dummy, I find that central government leaders have an impact on the corruption level in China.
When location dummy variables are used, my findings suggest that the more developed regions in
China tend to be less corrupt. Even though the results is not strong with one of the corruption
measure. The results may suggest that give province more revenue and expenditure autonomy may
help to lower corruption.
84
Table 3.1: Government Revenue and Ratio of Central and Local Governments
Year Revenue Central Local Central Local
1978 1132.26 175.77 956.49 15.5 84.5
1980 1159.93 284.45 875.48 24.5 75.5
1985 2004.82 769.63 1235.19 38.4 61.6
1990 2937.10 992.42 1944.68 33.8 66.2
1991 3149.48 938.25 2211.23 29.8 70.2
1992 3483.37 979.51 2503.86 28.1 71.9
1993 4348.95 957.51 3391.44 22.0 78.0
1994 5218.10 2906.50 2311.60 55.7 44.3
1995 6242.20 3256.62 2985.58 52.2 47.8
1996 7407.99 3661.07 3746.92 49.4 50.6
1997 8651.14 4226.92 4424.22 48.9 51.1
1998 9875.95 4892.00 4983.95 49.5 50.5
1999 11444.08 5849.21 5594.87 51.1 48.9
2000 13395.23 6989.17 6406.06 52.2 47.8
2001 16386.04 8582.74 7803.30 52.4 47.6
2002 18903.64 10388.64 8515.00 55.0 45.0
2003 21715.25 11865.27 9849.98 54.6 45.4
2004 26396.47 14503.10 11893.37 54.9 45.1
2005 31649.29 16548.53 15100.76 52.3 47.7
2006 38760.20 20456.62 18303.58 52.8 47.2
2007 51321.78 27749.16 23572.62 54.1 45.9
2008 61330.35 32680.56 28649.79 53.3 46.7
2009 68518.30 35915.71 32602.59 52.4 47.6
Notes: Data come from the China Statistical Yearbook.
85
Table 3.2: Government Expenditure and Ratio of Central and Local Governments
Year Expenditure Central Local Central Local
1978 1122.09 532.12 589.97 47.4 52.6
1980 1228.83 666.81 562.02 54.3 45.7
1985 2004.25 795.25 1209.00 39.7 60.3
1990 3083.59 1004.47 2079.12 32.6 67.4
1991 3386.62 1090.81 2295.81 32.2 67.8
1992 3742.20 1170.44 2571.76 31.3 68.7
1993 4642.30 1312.06 3330.24 28.3 71.7
1994 5792.62 1754.43 4038.19 30.3 69.7
1995 6823.72 1995.39 4828.33 29.2 70.8
1996 7937.55 2151.27 5786.28 27.1 72.9
1997 9233.56 2532.50 6701.06 27.4 72.6
1998 10798.18 3125.60 7672.58 28.9 71.1
1999 13187.67 4152.33 9035.34 31.5 68.5
2000 15886.50 5519.85 10366.65 34.7 65.3
2001 18902.58 5768.02 13134.56 30.5 69.5
2002 22053.15 6771.70 15281.45 30.7 69.3
2003 24649.95 7420.10 17229.85 30.1 69.9
2004 28486.89 7894.08 20592.81 27.7 72.3
2005 33930.28 8775.97 25154.31 25.9 74.1
2006 40422.73 9991.40 30431.33 24.7 75.3
2007 49781.35 11442.06 38339.29 23.0 77.0
2008 62592.66 13344.17 49248.49 21.3 78.7
2009 76299.93 15255.79 61044.14 20.0 80.0
Notes: Data come from the China Statistical Yearbook.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corruption(Crime) 310 1199.677 777.8733 41 3881
Corruption(Audit) 310 5341.71 3580.4 402 14358.5
Corruption(Transparency) 310 22.9327 4.7871 16.665 39.03
Fiscal Decentralization(Exp) 310 0.9409 0.6778 0.17973 3.7096
Fiscal Decentralization (Rev) 310 0.5671 0.6251 0.09911 3.2934
Relative Wage 310 1.1564 0.1503 0.6340 1.7901
Openness 310 0.0383 0.0501 0.0039 0.2263
Government Size 310 1660.039 1122.081 467.9092 8539.419
Population 310 4106.719 2616.969 252 9717
GDP per Capita 310 1.2351 0.9942 0.2301 6.7244
Notes: 310 observations are 31 provinces from 1998 to 2007.
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Table 3.4: Corruption (Number of Corruption Crime) and Fiscal Decentralization
Total Number Corruption Crime Corruption Crime per Capita





GDPperCapita 0.0585 0.0324 0.0071 -0.0057
( 0.0536) (0.0529) (0.0533) (0.0522)
RelativeWage -0.0178 -0.0212 -0.0640 -0.0642
(0.1193) (0.1209) (0.1186) (0.1194)
GovernmentSize 0.3015*** 0.1584** 0.2316** 0.1598**
(0.0945) (0.0761) (0.0939) (0.0752)
Openness -0.0596 -0.0285 -0.0493 -0.0342
(0.0553) (0.0539) (0.0550) (0.0532)
Leader -0.1294*** -0.1313*** -0.1366*** -0.1381***
(0.0391) (0.0398) (0.0389) (0.0393)
Constant 4.3446*** 5.470*** -3.0871*** -2.530***
( 0.8219) (0.6695) (0.8167) (0.6610)
R2 0.1017 0.1101 0.1405 0.1373
Hausman FE FE FE FE
Observations 310 310 310 310
Notes: Columns (1) to (2) are the results when using the number of corruption crime as the 
dependent variable, columns (3) to (4) are the results when using number of corruption 
crime per capita as the dependent variable; Standard errors are in the parentheses, *10% 
significant, **5% significant and ***1% significant.
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Table 3.5: Corruption (Number of Auditing Reports) and Fiscal Decentralization
Total Number Inspection Reprots Inspection Reports per Capita





GDPperCapita 0.3864*** -0.0854 -0.0874 -0.0130
(0.1269) (0.1225) (0.0769) ( 0.0678)
RelativeWage -0.6222** -0.7146*** -0.0876 -0.1256
(0.2464) (0.2718) (0.1494) (0.1504)
GovernmentSize -0.7818*** -1.7580*** -0.1447* -0.1058**
(0.14123) (0.0860) (0.0856) (0.0673)
Openness 0.3564 *** 0.3315*** 0.2064*** 0.2471***
(0.0658) (0.0790) (0.0399) (0.0437)
Leader -0.1752* -0.1889* -0.0280 -0.1031*
(0.1043) (0.1059) (0.0606) (0.0586)
Coastal -0.9581*** -0.9971*** -0.8004*** -0.7975***
(0.1183) (0.1291) (0.0689) (0.0686)
Central -0.2837*** -0.2972*** -0.3533*** -0.3500***
(0.0862) (0.0943) (0.0500) (0.0499)
Constant 15.7155*** 22.4919*** 4.9517*** 5.643***
(1.0287) ( 0.7356) (0.7413) (0.7196)
R2 0.6879 0.6282 0.3538 0.3590
Observations 310 310 310 310
Notes: Columns (1) to (2) are the results when using the number of inspection reports as the 
dependent variable, columns (3) to (4) are the results when using the number of inspection 
reports per capita as the dependent variable; Standard errors are in the parentheses, *10% 
significant, **5% significant and ***1% significant.
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Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses, *10% significant, **5% significant and 
***1% significant.
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Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1














[1− CpΨ(B(Cp, τ))] = 0
(18)














From equations (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain



















Using Cramer’s rule, two unknowns ∂θ∂Cp
, and ∂B∂Cp





























Using the assumption given in section 2, the sign for ∂θ∂Cp
is negative. Q.E.D
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Appendix B Proof of Proposition 2



























From equations (A.5) and (A.6), we obtain
















Using Cramer’s rule, two unknowns ∂θ∂τ , and
∂B
∂τ can be resolved. The unknown we care about is
∂θ


















Using the assumption given in section 2, the sign for ∂θ∂τ is negative. Q.E.D
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Appendix C Alternative Way to Consider the Firm’s Prob-
lem
To make the model simple, I assume there are two provinces p 1 and 2. Each province
has a corruption level Cpt in year t that will be used by the firm when reporting profit in year
t + 1. Provincial level governments and firms play a static game, moving sequentially. First, firms
observe the corruption level in year t in province p. Second, firms report year t+ 1 profit. There is
a possibility that an untruthful profit report will lead to punishment once the firm is caught. The
probability of being caught in a more corrupt province is lower than in a less corrupt province.
Firms try to maximize the following:
Ui(π̂i) = τi(πi − π̂i)− (γ − ξi)(πi − π̂i)2 −B − [1− CpΨ(B)]A(πi − π̂i) (26)
Firms try to maximize their expected gain from tax avoidance by choosing reported profit π̂i. The
benefit from tax avoidance is τi(πi − π̂i), that is, the difference between true profit πi and reported
profit π̂i times the tax rate τi.
(γ− ξi)(πi− π̂i)2 is the cost of hiding profit. Hiding profit is costly to firms, since they have
to spend time studying the tax law or need to hire accounting firms. It is easier to hide profits at
first; it would be hard to continue to find loopholes, and the quadratic form is one of the easiest
ways to capture this. γ is a positive parameter. ξi is a positive parameter if firms export to other
countries; otherwise ξi is zero. Because it is easy for firms to use transfer pricing if they export to
other countries, the cost will be lower for them.
Firms will use B as the bribe to government officials. The expected punishment faced by
firms is [1− CpΨ(B)]A(πi − π̂i). Cp is the corruption level in province p. If firms bribe the govern-
ment, the penalty will be less severe.3 A > 1 means firms will pay more than the profit they try to
under report. In China, this A is in the range of 50% to 500% of the tax avoidance.4
3Suppose the corruption level is observed by firms, and the corruption level is exogenous, then firms behavior
won’t influence the level of corruption. This is shown in appendix A
4Firms that failed to pay the tax would face punishment by regulators. According to article 25 of the corporate
income tax law “In the case of tax evasion by concealment or deception, or failure of paying tax within the prescribed
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Firms maximize their gain by choosing reported profit π̂i. The first order condition is
∂Ui
∂π̂i
= −τi − 2(γ − ξi)(πi − π̂i) + [1− CpΨ(B)]A = 0 (27)
After some algebra, gives
πi − π̂i =
τi − [1− CpΨ(B)]A
2(γ − ξi)
(28)
This leads to the following three Propositions:
Proposition 3 All else equal, firms in the more corrupt province tend to hide more profits.
Proof: Take the derivative of hidden profit, πi− π̂i, with respect to corruption level Cp, which gives
∂(πi−π̂i)
∂Cp




which means, all else equal, firms hide more profit if located in a more corrupt province. Intuitively,
in the more corrupt province, firms are more likely to establish a relationship with government
officials through bribes, so the officials would be less likely to audit the firms; thus, firms would be
more likely to hide their profits.
Proposition 4 All else equal, firms with higher tax rates tend to hide more profits.
Proof: Taking the derivative of hidden profit, πi− π̂i, with respect to the tax rate τi for firm i gives
∂(πi−π̂i)
∂τi




That is firms with higher tax rates tend to hide more profit.
Proposition 5 All else equal, firms that export tend to hide more profits.
time limit as provided in this law, and payment is still refused within the time limit despite the urge by the tax
authorities, the tax authorities shall pursue the payment of tax payable and impose a fine up to five times the tax
amount unpaid; and for the severe case, the criminal responsibility of the legal representative and the person with
direct responsibility shall be sought in accordance with the provisions of article 121 of the Criminal Law of China.”
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2(γ−ξi) , which equals πi− π̂i, is positive and γ−ξi




This means that when firms have exports, they will hide more profits. Firms that have access to
other countries can easily use transfer pricing, so they can hide more profit.
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